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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/114460


    Title: 地方政府預算制定之政治經濟分析:政治預算循環的觀點
    The Political-Economic Analysis on the Budgetary Decision-Making in Local Government: The View of Political Budget Cycle
    Authors: 傅彥凱
    Fu, Yan-Kai
    Keywords: 地方政府;預算制定;政治景氣循環;政治預算循環;縣市長選舉;混合迴歸
    local government;budgetary decision-making;political business cycle;political budget cycle;county magistrates and city mayors election;pooling regression
    Date: 2006-05
    Issue Date: 2017-11-08 11:10:39 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究欲籍用政治景氣循環理論來觀察地方執政者的政治意圖,而以地方選舉年作為觀測財政政策施放的時間點,並配合實證研究途程,期望經由實證結果所獲得的發現,對於窺探台灣地方實際的政治操作會有一定程度的幫助。本文將研究期間定為民國77年政府解嚴之後至民國90年止(1988-2001),利用台灣省各縣市政府的預算資料,進行混合迴歸分析,俾便於觀察縣市首長是否會於選舉年有操控地方政府預算,獲取選票的行為。實證結果發現,在地方縣市長選舉中,若是僅單獨觀察選舉年變數,我們並未發現縣市長選舉年時,地方政府各項財政政策工具會有顯著變化的情形。可是一旦考慮新任者與選舉年兩者的互動效果之後,即可發現尋求連任者(第一任者)與即將屆滿者(第二任者)兩者在支出預算及非稅課收入預算的操縱行為上有明顯的差異,新任者相較於即將屆滿者為能在連任選舉年尋求勝選,不惜在地方財政困窘的壓力下,藉由擴增財政支出及調降非稅課收入的方式吸引選票。
    This research attempts to apply political business cycle theory to observe the intention of local incumbents. Besides, through empirical research approach, the researcher hopes to gain some results, which would help to obtain better understanding of certain manipulation of politics during the year of local elections. During the research years between 1988 and 2001, the local government uses the total government budgeting dates resources from every county and city in Taiwan province, doing pooling regression analysis to observe whether during the year of county magistrates and city mayors election people manipulation fiscal policy tools to gain the ballot. The result of this paper is that, county magistrates and city mayors election have not a significant impact on the local fiscal policy tools. Nonetheless, we consider the interaction effects with the year of local elections and the first term incumbents, which have a significant impact on the local fiscal policy tools. To sum up, evidence in support of the local political budget cycle hypothesis.
    Relation: 選舉研究 , 13(1) , 119-162
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.6612%2ftjes.2006.13.01.119-162
    DOI: 10.6612/tjes.2006.13.01.119-162
    Appears in Collections:[選舉研究 TSSCI] 期刊論文

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