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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/114259


    Title: 集團間競租模型中集團內分租規則對競租活動之影響
    The Impact of Sharing Rule on Rent-Seeking Activities under the Two-Stage Between-Group Rent-Seeking Model
    Authors: 翁仁甫
    吳亭儀
    Ueng, Zen-Fu
    Wu, Ting-I
    Keywords: 集團間競租;租利分配規則;競租投入（支出）水準
    Between-group rent-seeking;Sharing rule;Rent-seeking outlays
    Date: 2017-06
    Issue Date: 2017-10-31 15:37:22 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文以 Katz and Tokatlidu（1996）所建立之兩階段集團間競租模型為基礎，另引用 Nitzan（1991a, 1991b）在其單階段聯合集團競租分析中所提出的集團內租利分配規則，做為第二階段賽局集團內部進行租利分配時的分租規則，建構一個兩階段集團間競租競賽模型並進行相關分析。全文討論的焦點在於探究集團內部租利分配規則的變動，究竟會對於集團內、集團間以及社會整體競租活動產生怎樣的影響效果。有別於 Nitzan（1991a）以及經濟直觀上認為當集團提高其依據均分方式來進行集團內租利分配的比例時，將會降低競租社會投入水準的觀點，本文發現個別集團單獨的提高其依據均分方式來進行集團內租利分配的比例時，在某些情況下會讓社會總競租投入（支出）水準增加而非下降。
    This paper extends Katz and Tokatlidu`s (1996) two-stage group rentseeking model by applying Nitzan`s single-stage intra-group rent sharing rule to the second stage game to construct a two-stage between-group rent-seeking model. Based on this two-stage between-group rent-seeking model, our discussion focuses on the effects of changing in intra-group rent sharing rule on intragroup, inter-group, and social rent-seeking activities. While Nitzan (1991a) and the conventional wisdom find that a more egalitarian rent sharing rule will reduce the social rent-seeking outlays in a single-stage game, our finding shows that the social rent-seeking outlays may increase rather than decrease when a single group takes a more egalitarian rent sharing rule in a two-stage game.
    Relation: Review of Social Sciences
    社會科學論叢, 11(1), 1-24
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[Journal of Social Sciences] Journal Articles

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