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    题名: 企業避稅與政府持股
    Corporate Tax Avoidance and Government Shareholding
    作者: 楊立晨
    贡献者: 郭振雄
    楊立晨
    关键词: 租稅規避
    政府持股
    公股主導
    雙權偏離
    Tax avoidance
    Government shareholding
    Government-controlled
    The deviation between control rights and cash flow rights
    日期: 2016
    上传时间: 2017-03-01 17:03:36 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本論文主要目的係探討政府持股與企業避稅間之關係。本文以2005年至2014年台灣公開發行以上公司為樣本，分析政府持股比例、代表政府董監事席次比例對租稅規避的影響，並檢視公股主導企業之避稅程度。

    實證結果顯示，政府持股比例對企業避稅無顯著影響，然而，當代表政府的董監事席次比例愈高，企業會減少避稅行為。此外，研究結果亦指出公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低。進一步分析公股主導之企業和雙權偏離互動對企業避稅之影響。實證分析發現，當股份盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較高，隱含公股主導之企業會透過避稅行為將財富移轉至企業本身；反之，當席次盈餘偏離程度愈大，公股主導之企業相對於家族企業，其避稅程度較低，表示政府掌握董事會席次時，能有效監督企業遵循稅法規定，採用較保守的租稅政策。
    The purpose of this study is to examine the association between government shareholding and tax avoidance. This study uses the data of Taiwan public companies from 2005 to 2014 to analyze whether government shareholding percentage and the ratio of directors held by the government have impact on tax avoidance, and investigate the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies.

    The empirical results reveal that government shareholding does not significantly affect corporate tax avoidance. However, when the ratio of directors held by the government increases, companies would reduce the level of tax avoidance. In addition, the results also indicate that government-controlled companies are less tax avoidance compared with family-controlled companies. This study conducts further analysis on the influence of the interaction of government-controlled companies and the deviation between control rights and cash flow rights on tax avoidance. The results show that the higher the level of the deviation between voting rights and cash flow rights, the higher the level of tax avoidance of government-controlled companies than family-controlled companies. It implies that government-controlled companies might transfer fund to themselves through tax avoidance. On the contrary, when the deviation between the ratio of controlled board seats and cash flow rights increases, the government-controlled companies engage in less tax avoidance than family-controlled companies. It represents that when the board of directors is controlled by the government, it could effectively supervise the company to comply with tax regulations, and the company would adopt conservative tax strategies.
    參考文獻: 中文部分
    李冠皓與黃培琳 (2010)，「公司治理模組解釋(四)集團控制型態-以上市櫃公司為例」，《貨幣觀測與信用評等》，83，93-101。
    林江亮與鄭菽萱 (2006)，「政府持股與公司價值之關聯性研究」，《當代會計》，7 (2)，237-260。
    林宛瑩與許崇源 (2008)，「台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議」，《交大管理學報》，28 (1)，269-312。
    林嬌能與許彩蓮 (2011)，「家族企業與租稅規劃之關聯性」，《會計學報》，4 (1)，23-49。
    凌忠嫄 (2013)，「當前財政問題之因應」，《當代財政》，26，1-12。
    許崇源、李怡宗、林宛瑩與鄭桂蕙 (2003)，「控制權與盈餘分配權偏離之衡量(上)」，《貨幣觀測與信用評等》，42，15-31。
    陳明進與蔡麗雯 (2006)，「財稅所得差異決定因素及課稅所得推估之研究」， 《管理學報》，23 (6)，739-763。
    游麗君 (2016)，「我國財政收支與經濟成長之關聯」，《當代財政》，45 (4)，118-141。
    黃美祝與楊佩璇 (2011)，「集團企業與非集團企業避稅程度之比較」，《會計學報》，4 (1)，1-22。
    葉銀華 (2016)，「泛公股企業之治理機制」，《會計研究月刊》，370，21-25。
    魏妤珊、邱敬貿與黃淑惠 (2015)，「法人董事與企業避稅：台灣股票市場之實證研究」，《證券市場發展季刊》，27 (4)，1-42。

    中文網路資料
    2014年中央政府總決算審核報告(附冊-總決算部分)。取自：
    http://www.audit.gov.tw/files/15-1000-2206,c250-1.php。
    2015年財政統計年報。取自：
    https://www.mof.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=285&pid=70924。
    中華民國統計資訊網國民所得及經濟成長統計資料庫。取自：
    http://statdb.dgbas.gov.tw/pxweb/Dialog/NI.asp。
    台灣經濟新報資料庫TCGI股權結構集團組成資料。取自：
    http://www.tej.com.tw/webtej/plus/wcg1.htm。
    財政部統計資料庫。取自：
    https://www.mof.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeid=100。
    國際會計準則第28號投資關聯企業及合資(2013年版)。取自：
    http://163.29.17.154/ifrs_2013_approved/pdf/IAS28_2013.pdf。

    英文部分
    Bradshaw, M., G. Liao, and M. Ma (2016), “Ownership structure and tax avoidance: Evidence from agency costs of state ownership in China,” Available at SSRN 2239837.
    Chen, S., X. Chen, Q. Cheng, and T. Shevlin (2010), “Are family firms more tax aggressive than non-family firms?” Journal of Financial Economics, 95 (1), 41-61.
    Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L.H.P. Lang (2000), “The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 58 (1-2), 81-112.
    Dechow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. P. Sweeney (1995), “Detecting earnings management,” The Accounting Review, 70 (2), 193–225.
    Desai, M.A. and D. Dharmapala (2006), “Corporate tax avoidance and high-powered incentives,” Journal of Financial Economics, 79 (1), 145-179.
    Desai, M.A. and D. Dharmapala (2009), “Corporate tax avoidance and firm value,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (3), 537-546.
    Dhaliwal, D. S., S. X. Huang, W. J. Moser, and R. Pereira (2011), “Corporate tax avoidance and the level and valuation of firm cash holdings,” Available at SSRN 1800140.
    Ding, Y., H. Zhang, and J. Zhang (2007), “Private vs state ownership and earnings management: Evidence from Chinese listed companies,” Corporate Governance, 15 (2), 223-238.
    Dyreng, S., M. Hanlon, and E. L. Maydew (2008), “Long-run corporate tax avoidance,” The Accounting Review, 83 (1), 61-82.
    Faccio, M. and L.H.P. Lang (2002), “The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 65 (3), 365-395.
    Gupta, S. and K. Newberry (1997), “Determinants of the variability in corporate effective tax rates: Evidence from Longitudinal Data,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 16 (1), 1-34.
    Hanlon, M. and S. Heitzman (2010), “A review of tax research,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50 (2), 127-178.
    Hanlon, M., E. L. Maydew, and D. Saavedra (2013), “Understanding why firms hold so much cash: A tax risk explanation,” Working paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of North Carolina.
    Healy, P. M. (1985), “The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (1-3), 85-107.
    Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling (1976), “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency and ownership structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), 305-360.
    Khurana, I. K. and W. J. Moser (2013), “Institutional shareholders’ investment horizons and tax avoidance,” The Journal of the American Taxation Association, 35 (1), 111-134.
    La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (2002), “Investor protection and corporate valuation,” Journal of Finance, 57 (3), 1147-1170.
    La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer (1999), “Corporate ownership around the world,” Journal of Finance, 54 (2), 471-517.
    Lanis, R. and G. Richardson (2011), “The effect of board of director composition on corporate tax aggressiveness,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30 (1), 50-70.
    Li, O. Z., H. Liu, and C. Ni (2014), “Controlling shareholders’ incentive and corporate tax avoidance-A natural experiment in China,” Available at SSRN 2401619.
    Manzon, G. B. and G. A. Plesko (2002), “The relation between financial and tax reporting measures of income,” Tax Law Review, 55 (2), 175-214.
    Phillips, J., M. Pincus, and S. O. Rego (2003), “Earnings management: New evidence based on deferred tax expense,” The Accounting Review, 78 (2), 491-521.
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    Salihu, I. A., S. N. S. Obid, and H. A. Annuar (2014), “Government ownership and corporate tax avoidance: Empirical evidence from Malaysia,” Handbook on Emerging Trends in Scientific Research, 673-689.
    Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1997), “A survey of corporate governance,” Journal of Finance, 52 (2), 737-783.
    Sun, Q., W. H. S. Tong, and J. Tong (2002), “How does government ownership affect firm performance? Evidence from China’s privatization experience,” Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 29 (1-2), 1-27.
    Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke (2001), “Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan,” International Review of Finance, 2 (1/2), 21-48.
    Zeng, T. (2011), “Ownership concentration, state ownership, and effective tax rates: Evidence from China’s listed firms,” Accounting Perspectives, 9 (4), 271-289.
    Zhang, H., W. Li, and M. Jian (2012), “How does state ownership affect tax avoidance? Evidence from China,” Working paper, Singapore Management University.
    Zimmerman, J. L. (1983), “Taxes and firm size,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 119-149.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    101255015
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101255015
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 學位論文

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