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| Title: | 中國大陸中央對地方轉移支付之影響因子—以空間追蹤計量模型分析
Determinants of Transfers from Central to Local Governments in China─Evidence from Spatial Econometrics Analysis |
| Authors: | 李奕碁
Li, I Chi |
| Contributors: | 黃智聰
Huang, Jr Tsung
李奕碁
Li, I Chi |
| Keywords: | 中央對地方轉移支付
地方在中央政治權力指數
空間自我相關
空間杜賓模型
transfer payments from central to local governments
political power in the central government
spatial autocorrelation
Spatial-Durbin model |
| Date: | 2016 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-08-09 10:42:37 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 中國大陸之中央對地方轉移支付，為1994年分稅制改革以後，透過增劃中央稅收，提高中央政府平衡區域發展，及達成特定政策目標的財政工具。中央政府對地方之財政轉移支付，目標多以弭平省市地區間水平財政情況差異，以及提供省市地區公共支出之需求。然而，轉移支付的分配模式中，是否確實已平衡區域發展，並提供適足之公共支出財源為依歸？或者，其分配受到省市地區政府在中央政治權力的影響，對省市地區的利益可能造成什麼影響？省市地區在中央的代理人，其間的競爭與合作，最終究竟使省市地區多得利益，還是受到損害？本文之研究目的為，為具有區域同質性的中國大陸中央對地方轉移支付引進空間計量實證分析，並研究轉移支付分配模式之影響因子，資料期間為1995年至2013年，包含中國大陸共31個省市地區。引進空間計量之原因，係在以轉移支付分布圖之分析後，為捕捉各省市地區之間的轉移支付數量的相互影響性。在考慮空間相依性的實證模型分析下，更進一步分析財政容量因子、財政需求因子以及政治影響因子對轉移支付分配的現象，改善過去文獻關於政治權力解釋變數加權方式欠缺的理論基礎，以及實證模型設定上可能的疏漏。
本文實證模型透過檢定，決定使用隨機效果空間杜賓模型之分析結果，發現自1995年至2013年，各省市地區之人均轉移支付呈現顯著之空間相關性，而空間相依性之模式為，鄰近地區之轉移支付對該某省市地區具有顯著正向影響。此外，實證研究中，人均生產毛額、財政赤字率、扶養比、農村人口占比、少數民族占比，皆對人均財政轉移支付具有顯著正向影響；而省市地區在中央政治權力指標，則對轉移支付具有顯著負向影響，是為「代理人競爭資源流失效果」。
Since 1994, a tax revenue allocation system known as the “central to local transfer payments” has been implemented by China’s Central Government. The main policy objectives of transfer payments are about the elimination of the fiscal disparities among provinces, and the provision of public spending demands to specific policy.
As a fiscal policy tool, the transfer payment system endows the power for China`s central government to balance the regional developments, and to achieve specific policy objectives such as environment protection, agricultural development, and political stability. However, through the mode of the allocation, are the transfer payments indeed balancing the regional developments, and providing the adequate financial resources of local expenditure? Or the allocation of transfer payments is affected by the political power of provinces and cities in the central government? Are the interests of the provinces and cities affected by the cooperation or competition of their agents in the central government? If the effects indeed exist, are they increasing benefits, or causing damage? The purpose of this study is to take research on the determinants to the transfer payments per capita, using the spatial econometrics model for the existence of spatial autocorrelation of the transfer payments. In consider of the spatial autocorrelation, the empirical study analyses the effects of the financial capacity factors, fiscal demand factors as well as the political power factor on the allocation of transfer payments, improving the theoretical basis that the past literatures built on the political power factors, and eliminating the omitted variable bias.
Considering the results of Moran’s I, Hausman test and Wald tests, I decided to use the random effect Spatial-Durbin model. The results show that from 1995 to 2013, transfer payments per capita among regions are significantly positive spatial correlated to one another. In addition, the result of spatial econometric analysis shows that the transfer payments per capita are significantly and positively affected by the gross province production per capita, fiscal deficit ratio, dependency ratio, the proportion of rural population and ethnic minorities; and the political power indicators of provinces have significant negative effect on transfer payments per capita. We call the negative effect of political power the “competition resource loss effect." |
| Reference: | 一、英文文獻
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二、中文文獻
王紹光（2002），「中國財政轉移支付的政治邏輯」，《戰略與管理》，2002年，第3期，頁1-25。
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周黎安（2004），「晉升博弈中政府官員的激勵與合作：兼論我國地方保護主義和重複建設問 題長期存在的原因」，《經濟研究》，2004年，第6期，頁33–40。
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
103255014 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1032550141 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
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