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    题名: 財務長與審計委員會相對影響力及客戶重要性對財務報導品質之影響
    The Impact of CFO versus Audit Committee Power and Client Importance on Financial Reporting Quality
    作者: 宋尹綉
    贡献者: 金成隆
    宋尹綉
    关键词: 財務長
    審計委員會
    相對任期
    財務報表重編
    客戶重要性
    CFO
    audit committee
    relative tenure
    financial restatement
    client importance
    日期: 2016
    上传时间: 2016-07-20 16:40:33 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 　　本研究以財務長與審計委員會相對任期作為財務長與審計委員會相對影響力之指標，探討財務長與審計委員會相對影響力對財務報表重編之影響。利用2007至2014年間中國滬深A股為樣本，本研究發現，財務長之任期較審計委員會長時，財務報表越有可能重編，顯示財務長相對於審計委員會影響力較大時，會降低財務報表品質。本研究亦發現，前述情況並不因為客戶重要性較高而更加明顯，顯示財務長與審計委員會相對影響力與財務報表重編之關係，不會受到客戶重要性的影響。
    　　This thesis uses the relative tenures of CFO and audit committee as an indicator of the relative power between CFO and audit committee, and examines the relation between the relative power of CFO versus audit committee and the probability of financial restatement. Based on a sample of A-share stocks listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen during 2007-2014, the empirical result shows that when CFO has relative higher tenure than audit committee, the incidence of financial restatement increases. This result suggests that CFO who has more power than audit committee tends to compromise the quality of financial statement, at least in terms of financial restatement. The empirical result also shows that the effect of the relative power of CFO and audit committee does not vary among clients’ importance.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    103353023
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353023
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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