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    题名: 經理人權益基礎薪酬與策略聯盟之關聯性研究
    An Empirical Study of the Association between Executive Equity-based Compensation and Strategic Alliances
    作者: 陳襄瑋
    Chen, Hsiang Wei
    贡献者: 梁嘉紋
    Liang, Jia Wen
    陳襄瑋
    Chen, Hsiang Wei
    关键词: 權益基礎薪酬
    策略聯盟
    代理問題
    Equity-based Compensation
    Strategic Alliances
    Agency Problem
    日期: 2016
    上传时间: 2016-07-20 16:40:06 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 在經營權與所有權分離的企業經營環境中，權益基礎薪酬扮演著連結股東與經理人利益之重要角色。本研究旨在探討經理人權益基礎薪酬與企業策略聯盟行為間之關聯性，並進一步檢視權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成、策略聯盟數目、類別及跨產業聯盟與否之影響。本研究以2003年至2013年美國上市櫃公司為樣本，研究結果顯示經理人權益基礎薪酬對於企業策略聯盟形成有正向影響。給予經理人較高比重權益基礎薪酬之企業，不僅形成策略聯盟之機率較高，且形成策略聯盟之次數亦較多。再者，給予經理人權益基礎薪酬較高比重之企業，其形成研發聯盟之可能性較高，且更傾向於形成同產業間策略聯盟。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    103353005
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353005
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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