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    題名: 勞動逃漏稅、失業率與經濟成長
    Tax Evasion of Labor Incomes, Unemployment Rate, and Economic Growth
    作者: 俞秋詠
    Yu, Chau Wing
    貢獻者: 洪福聲
    Hung, Fu Sheng
    俞秋詠
    Yu, Chau Wing
    關鍵詞: 逃漏稅
    失業率
    經濟成長
    日期: 2016
    上傳時間: 2016-07-01 15:25:22 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本文結合勞動市場資訊不對稱與逃漏稅行為於一模型中，將勞動市場資訊
    不對稱現象設立為模型的第一階段，而模型的第二階段則設定為勞動者逃漏
    稅之決定，再以倒推法先後得出最適逃漏稅比例與均衡失業率。接著，我們
    將分別以資訊不對稱、金融發展程度等變數檢視逃漏稅與失業率如何與經濟成
    長產生連結；另外，更將透過比較靜態分析，探討在各外生變數變動下，如何
    影響經濟體系之稅率、失業率與經濟成長率。據本研究的數值模擬以及比較靜
    態分析結果發現，金融發展程度越好的國家，低能力勞動者會產生較大的意願
    至廠商就業，而在均衡分離型就業契約下，失業率必須上升，以驅使低能力勞
    動者無法進入廠商就業，最後，帶來經濟成長率的上升；反之對於金融發展程
    度較差國家而言，此時低能力勞動者沒有意願至廠商就業，帶來了失業率下降
    與經濟成長率下降的現象。
    參考文獻: 中文文獻:
    [ 1 ] 黃仁德及羅時萬(2000)，《現代經濟成長理論》，華泰文化出版。
    [ 2 ] 李建強(2003)，「金融發展、經濟成長與資本所得稅」，《國立中正大學國際經濟研究所博士論文》。
    英文文獻:
    [ 3 ] Aghion, P. and P. Howitt (1992), “A Model of Growth through Creative.Destruction,” Econometrica, 60, 2, 323–351.
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    [ 18 ] Easterly, W. and Rebelo, S. (1993). Fiscal policy and economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics, 32(3), 417-458.
    [ 19 ] Fu, J. (1996), “The effects of asymmetric information on economic growth,”Southern Economic Journal, 63, 312-26.
    [ 20 ] Gordon, R. and W. Li (2009), “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,” Journal of Public Economics, 93(7), 855-866.
    [ 21 ] Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991), “Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy,” MIT Press, Cambridge.
    [ 22 ] Harrod, Roy F. (1939), “An Essay in Dynamic Theory,” Economic Journal, 49(March): 14–33.
    [ 23 ] Hung, F. S. and W. R. Liao (2007), “Self-financing, Asymmetric Information,and Government Spending in a Simple Endogenous Growth Model,” Taiwan Economic Review, 35, 249-284.
    [ 24 ] Hung, F. S. and C. C. Lee (2010), “Asymmetric Information, Government Fiscal Policies, and Financial Development,” Economic Development Quarterly.
    [ 25 ] Hung, F. S. (2015), “Tax Evasion, Financial Dualism, and Economic Growth,”Academia Economic Papers, 43:2, 175-213.
    [ 26 ] Kolm, S.-C. (1973), “A Note on Optimum Tax Evasion,” Journal of Public Economics, 2,209
    [ 27 ] Lucas, R. E. Jr. (1988), “On the Mechanics of Economic Development,”Journal of Monetary. Economics 22，p.3-42. 20.
    [ 28 ] Romer, P. M. (1986), “Increasing Return and Long-Run Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 94(5), 1002-1037.
    [ 29 ] Romer, P. M. (1990), “Endogenous Technological Change,” Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), s71-s102.
    [ 30 ] Rebelo, S. (1991), "Long Run Policy Analysis and the Long Run Growth",Journal of Policy Economy, 99, pp.500-521.
    [ 31 ] Slemrod, J. (2006), “Taxation and Big Brother: Information, Personalization,and Privacy in 21st Century Tax Policy,” Fiscal Studies, 27, 1–15.
    [ 32 ] Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (1987), “The Optimal Size of a Tax Collection Agency,” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 89, 25–34.
    [ 33 ] Slemrod, J. and S. Yitzhaki (2002), “Tax Avoidance, Evasion, and Administration,” Handbook of Public Economics, 3, 1423–1470.
    [ 34 ]Spence, A. M. (1973), “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,87, 355–374.
    [ 35 ] Spence, A. M. (1974), “ Market Signaling: Informational Transfer in Hiring and Related Screening Processes,” Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
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    [ 39 ] Young, A. (1991), “Learning by Doing and the Dynamic Effects of International Trade,” NBER Working Papers, 3577.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    103258041
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103258041
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[經濟學系] 學位論文

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