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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/96529


    Title: 政府契約委外的再檢視：目標、理論應用、績效衡量、與知識論基礎
    Other Titles: Revisiting Contracting-Out: Goals, Theoretical Grounding, Performance Measurement, and Epistemology
    Authors: 陳重安
    Chen, Chung-An
    Keywords: 契約委外;私有化;經濟途徑;社會─政治途徑;比較分析
    contracting-out;privatization;economic approach;socio-political approach;comparative analysis
    Date: 2011-09
    Issue Date: 2016-05-11 16:24:30 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 在八○年代新政府運動的帶頭下，私有化長久以來被認為是一個經濟典範下的產物，也是幫助政府節省成本、追求效率的一種最佳方法之一，而契約委外可謂是這個私有化潮流下最有代表性的工具。筆者檢視國際上契約委外的諸多個案分析，發現到無效率、浪費、失敗的例子多得不勝枚舉，但是各國政府仍不斷的將其政府服務發包給私人企業或民間社團。筆者不禁懷疑：難到「追求效率」這個假定有問題嗎？在回顧文獻之後，筆者認為契約委外的研究長期以來受到經濟典範的影響，導致出現了一些偏差的假定，這些偏差假定進而影響契約管理研究不當的理論應用、績效衡量、以及知識論基礎。若從社會─政治途徑的角度來觀察，我們會發現契約委外本身的目標不一定是為了效率，很多時候可能是政治上合理性與正當性的考量。在此情形下，我們將經濟途徑的理論，例如代理人理論與交易成本理論，應用在契約管理的研究上，便成了「牛頭不對馬嘴」的謬誤。在績效衡量上，學者們也忽略了許多社會與政治面向上的指標，好比說廉潔程度、課責性、與勞動市場的問題。爰此，本文藉由文獻回顧，分析研究契約委外的兩種途徑：經濟途徑與社會─政治途徑，並用平行陳列的方式比較兩種途徑的目標、契約管理的理論應用、績效衡量、與知識論基礎。筆者並期待學者們在未來的研究中能就社會─政治面做更多的探索。
    Although contracting-out has long been considered as one of the best ways to help government enhance the overall level of efficiency, empirical evidence suggests that inefficient contracting is prevalent in public organizations. Ironically, inefficiency does not impede the use of contracting in governments. The fact that legitimacy instead of efficiency is the paramount concern for government contracting is probably the origin of this paradox. In this, the author reexamines theories, performance measurement, and epistemology of public sector contracting. The author argues that applying principal-agent theory, transaction costs theory, and market theorem to government contracting may be misleading. Theories in sociology and political science can more appropriately depict the dynamics of government contracting. Socio-political indicators such as probity, accountability, and problems in a labor market are more adequate performance measures. In sum, public administration scholars are encouraged to employ the socio-political approach to conduct contracting research in the future.
    Relation: 公共行政學報, 40,111-143
    Journal of Public Administration National Chengchi University
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[Journal of Public Administration] Journal Articles

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