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    Title: 借殼上市公司的代理問題與經營績效之關係
    Authors: 倪偉倫
    Contributors: 周行一
    倪偉倫
    Date: 2002
    Issue Date: 2016-05-09 16:25:43 (UTC+8)
    Abstract:   過去十年來台灣股票市場興起一股「借殼上市」的熱潮,由於借殼上市屬於購併方式的一種,由學理上應該是能夠降低公司代理問題,提升公司績效的行為,但是後來這些被借殼公司卻常有財務危機的情況發生。為了找出可能的原因,本文利用一些股權變數來代表代理問題的嚴重性,比較借殼前後期的結果,並驗證是否這些變數就是造成公司績效變差的主因。
      實證結果顯示:
      1.比較被借殼公司在借殼前後,本文所提出可能造成代理問題更嚴重的代理變數:董監事或大股東採用金字塔結構和交叉持股、董監事持股、大股東現金流量權和控制權差距、董監事質押比例和最大股東佔有董事會比例,皆達到統計上顯著惡化的結果。
      2.董監事或大股東採用金字塔結構將對公司的股價報酬產生負面的影響,但是交叉持股卻未達統計上影響。
      3.董監事持股比例對公司股價報酬的改變無顯著影響。
      4.大股東現金流量權和控制權差距越大公司的短期股價報酬越差。
      5.董監事質押比例越高,對被借殼公司股價報酬的影響,短期為負,中期為正,長期為負。
      6.最大股東佔董事會比例越高,公司的股價報酬越差,並且在中長期有更顯著的趨勢。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    89357014
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2010000414
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Finance] Theses

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