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| Title: | 策略性環境政策、跨國性污染與最適出口補貼協定 |
| Authors: | 張伊君
Chang, Yi-Chun |
| Contributors: | 賴育邦
張伊君
Chang, Yi-Chun |
| Keywords: | 消費性污染
跨國性污染
貿易協定
出口補貼
污染稅稅率
Consumption externality
Transboundary pollution
Trade agreement
Export subsidy
Environmental taxes |
| Date: | 2009 |
| Issue Date: | 2016-05-09 15:15:49 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 本文將貿易政策與環境政策做連結, 建構一雙邊貿易之架構, 設立一三階段之序列賽局,以之探討: 當具有跨國性質之消費性污染存在時, 在考量兩國政府皆有誘因在環境政策上採取非合作的態度下, 兩國政府應如何藉由貿易政策之協定, 訂定其最適之出口品補貼政策, 以矯正環境政策非合作下之不效率。
本文研究發現: 在兩國政府僅能夠進行政策的部分合作時, 當需求參數愈大, 兩國政府之最適貿易政策是應將給予其各自國家出口品之單位補貼調升;但若伴隨消費財貨所排放之污染對環境具有較高之邊際污染, 或是其本身之外溢效果愈強, 兩國政府對出口品之最適補貼則應該調降。我們同時也發現, 此時即使各國政府之最適貿易政策是調降出口補貼, 會使得各國之污染稅稅率更低, 但卻不會使其更加偏離兩國政府在環境政策上合作下之最適稅率, 並且仍會為全球帶來更高之社會福利。
This paper constructs a reciprocal-market model, which contains a three-stage game to investigate how the two countries decide the optimal export subsidy agreement when they do not coordinate their environmental policy. We find that the level of optimal export subsidy should decrease with the strength of transboundary pollution, which is associated to consumption activities. In addition, the export subsidy agreement should increase with the demand parameter. We also find that even a reduction in the export subsidy will decrease the non-coordinated environmental tax rate, it will not deviate the tax rate away from the coordinated one and still enhance the social welfare. |
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Tanguay, G.A. (2001), “Strategic Environmental Policies under International Duopolistic Competition,” International Tax and Public Finance, 8, 793–811. |
| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
96255005 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255005 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財務管理學系] 學位論文
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