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    题名: 董監事專業性與公司績效波動程度關聯性之研究
    Board expertise and the variability of corporate performance
    作者: 林貞吟
    贡献者: 林宛瑩
    林貞吟
    关键词: 董事會
    專業性
    經營績效波動程度
    日期: 2009
    上传时间: 2016-05-09 15:07:11 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 對投資人與債權人而言，企業之績效與風險為影響其作成投資與授信決策之重要資訊。近年來，國內主管機關針對董事會成員應具備之能力予以規範，冀望透過公司董事會成員在營運判斷力、會計及財務分析能力之提升，增進企業決策品質。本研究探討董監事專業性是否有助於董事會效能之發揮，進而對企業風險產生影響，以公司績效(含市場績效及財務績效)波動程度衡量企業風險，董監事之學、經歷定義其專業性，探討董監事專業性與公司績效波動程度之關聯性，並進一步分析公司經營特性(董事會專業需求、研發投入程度)對董監專業性與公司績效波動程度關聯性之影響。
    主要研究結果顯示，就董監專業整體效果而言，董監事財務專業與公司價值波動程度呈正向關係。將公司經營特性納入考量後，本研究發現，對專業需求高且研發密度高的公司而言，董監事之會計專業與公司價值波動程度及股票報酬率波動程度均呈負向關係；財務、法律專業則與公司價值波動程度呈正向關係。對專業需求低且研發密度低的公司而言，董監會計專業則與公司價值波動程度及股票報酬率波動程度呈正向關係；法律專業與公司價值波動程度呈負相關係，顯示公司經營特性對董監之專業性與經營績效波動程度之關聯性有顯著影響。
    Firm’s performance and its related risks are critical information for investors and creditors to make investment and lending decisions. In recent years, Taiwan Stock Exchange and Gretai Securities Market implemented requirements on board members’ expertise. This study examines whether board’s expertise would affect the effectiveness of the board and further have impacts on firm’s risks, proxied by the variability of corporate performance. I also include corporate operating characteristics (such as advising needs and R&D intensity) to investigate whether these characteristics would affect the relationship aforementioned.
    The empirical results indicate that board members’ financial expertise is positively associated with the variability of Tobin’s q. After including firm operating characteristics, I find that for firms with greater advising needs and higher R&D intensity (less advising needs and lower R&D intensity), board members’ accounting expertise is negatively (positively) associated with the variability of stock return and Tobin’s Q, board members’ law expertise is positively (negatively) associated with the variability of Tobin’s Q, and with more financial experts on the board, the firm experiences greater variability of Tobin’s Q.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    96353011
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    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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