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    題名: 合縱與連橫的賽局分析-同時與循序移動
    A Game-Theoretic analysis of hezong and lianheng-simultaneous and sequential moves
    作者: 粘思婷
    Nian, Sih Ting,
    貢獻者: 王智賢
    粘思婷
    Nian, Sih Ting,
    關鍵詞: 同盟
    合縱
    連橫
    三人賽局
    alliance
    coalition
    league
    Hezong
    Lianheng
    three players
    日期: 2009
    上傳時間: 2016-05-09 11:45:19 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 我們建立一個無窮多期的三人賽局，嘗試討論歷史上著名的合縱與連橫同盟策略。每位參賽者可以選擇自己的同盟對象，以增加最後獲勝的機率。我們從同時移動的賽局結構中，得到合縱策略(實力較弱的參賽者之間同盟)與連橫策略(與實力最強的參賽者同盟)均存在於混合策略。這將有助於同時解釋三國赤壁之戰的同盟、南宋與蒙古同盟等歷史事件。
    This paper will study a three-player game with infinite periods where each player decides whether to league together to increase his winning rate. We discuss which one will be chosen to be the member of leagues. The results show that Hezong and Lianheng both exist in mixed strategy Nash equilibriums of simultaneous move game. It is possible that the fall of Jin and the Battle of Red Cliffs in Chinese history were just coincident or random events. Furthermore the players usually have a tendency to be in league with the strongest.
    參考文獻: Beest, I. V., H. Wilke and E. V. Dijk. “The Excluded Player in Coalition Formation.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 29, no. 2 (2003): 237–247.
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    Beest, I. V., E. V. Dijk, C. K. W. D. Dreu and H. A. M. Wilke. “Do-No-Harm in Coalition Formation: Why Losses Inhibit Exclusion and Promote Fairness Cognitions.” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 41, no. 6 (2005): 609-617.
    Bottom, W. P., J. Holloway, S. McClurg and G. J. Miller. “Negotiating a Coalition: Risk, Quota Shaving, and Learning to Bargain.” Journal of Conflict Resolution
    44, no. 2 (2000): 147–169.
    Eguia, J. X.. “Voting Blocs, Coalition and Parties.” Social Science Working Paper 1257, 2006.
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    Feix, M. R., D. Lepelley, V. R. Merlin and J.-L. Rouet. “On the Voting Power of an Alliance and the Subsequent Power of Its Members.” Social Choice and Welfare 28, no. 2 (2007): 181–207.
    Ikonnikova, S.. “Coalition Formation, Bargaining and Investments in Networks with Externalities: Analysis of the Eurasian Gas Supply Network.” Munich Personal RePEc Archive (MPRA) Paper NO. 915, 2007.
    Konrad, K. A. and D. Kovenock. “The Alliance Formation Puzzle and Capacity Constraints.” Discussion Paper SP II 2008 – 07, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin, 2008.
    Neary, H. M.. “To Fight or Not to Fight: Equilibrium Structure in a Conflict Model when Conflict is Costly.” mimeo, Department of Economics, University of British Columbia, 1996.
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    Skaperdas, S.. “Contest Success Functions.” Economic Theory 7, no. 2 (1996): 283–290.
    Skaperdas, S.. “On the Formation of Alliances in Conflict and Contests.” Public Choice 96, no. 1-2 (1998): 25–42.
    Sorokin, G. L.. “Alliance Formation and General Deterrence: A Game-Theoretic Model and the Case of Israel.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, no. 2 (1994): 298–325.
    Tan, G. and R. Wang. “Endogenous coalition formation in rivalry.” Queen’s Economics Department Working Paper No. 956, 1997.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    96255025
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0096255025
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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