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    Title: 現金持有率、公司價值與公司治理之關連性--台灣上市櫃公司實證研究
    Authors: 李智蕙
    Contributors: 陳錦烽
    李智蕙
    Keywords: 現金持有率
    公司治理
    公司價值
    Cash holdings
    corporate governance
    firm value
    Date: 2008
    Issue Date: 2016-05-09 11:28:59 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究係探討公司治理機制是否影響台灣上市櫃公司之現金持有率,並透過檢驗公司治理對公司現金持有價值之影響,來探討公司治理如何影響公司之價值。本研究發現,董事會規模及董事會內部化程度顯著影響公司現金持有率之高低,並發現公司之董事長是否兼任總經理、董事會內部化程度、董監持股率、機構法人持股率、公司是否屬家族控制型態、控制股東之盈餘分配權,以及股份控制權之偏離程度等因素,均影響公司現金之價值,此種結果與現金持有之代理觀點一致。換言之,公司治理機制較差的公司,其管理者(或控制股東)易因個人私利而影響公司現金持有政策,而控制股東與小股東間的核心代理問題,也會顯著降低公司現金持有價值。
    This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and corporate cash holdings of Taiwanese listed companies, and further explores how corporate governance characteristics impact a firm’s value through the value of its cash holdings. Our empirical results show that board size and insider dominance of the board are important determinants of cash holdings. In addition, the duality of chairman and CEO, insider dominance of the board, percentage of equity ownership held by directors, the ratio of institution stockholdings, family-control of a firm, the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights all affect the value of a firm’s cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the agency view of cash holdings. That is, managers in the firms with poor corporate governance have more incentive to influence corporate cash policies for their own benefits, and the core agency problem between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders affect the value of cash holdings negatively.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    95353036
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0095353036
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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