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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/89573


    Title: 股權結構對公司績效影響之研究
    Authors: 張明峰
    Contributors: 陳隆麒
    張明峰
    Date: 1991
    1990
    Issue Date: 2016-05-02 17:00:05 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 目前多數中、大型企業皆以『經營權與所有權分離』的組織型態來經營，以期達到專業化的目的。然而管程當局與企業股東之間的『代理問題』卻往往導致公司經營績效的降低。由於一般股東的股權過於分散，難以直接有效地監督管理當局，在此情形下，實有必要仰賴董事會來監督、考核企業經營者行為的正當性與決策的品質。因此，本論文的目的即在：
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    7. 黃英陶，代理問題對公司資本結構影響之研究，成功大學工業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十六年六月。
    8 .戴淵明，公司控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究一一台灣地區上市公司之實證分析，中興大學企管研究所未出版碩士論文，民國七十五年六月。
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    企業管理學系
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004867
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Business Administation] Theses

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