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    題名: 競租活動與福利成本之估計
    Rent-Seeking Activities and Welfare Cost Caculate
    作者: 許春梅
    Hsu, Chuen Mei
    貢獻者: 傅豐誠
    Fu, Feng Cherng
    許春梅
    Hsu, Chuen Mei
    關鍵詞: 競租
    福利成本
    利益團體
    rent-seeking
    welfare cost
    interest group
    日期: 1993
    上傳時間: 2016-04-29 16:42:38 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 國家的強制權力創造了龐大的租利(rent)。個人或團體往往投入時間、金
    參考文獻: 參考文獻
    一、 中文部分
    1. 官俊榮（民國81年）：「農業所得與福利政策之檢討」，農業金融論叢，第27輯，頁1-26。
    2. 陳添枝、劉孟俊（民國82年）：「台灣貿易保護的形成因素」，中央研究院經濟研究所經濟論文，第21卷第一期，頁1-30。
    3. 陳順義（民國78年）：「利益團體與關稅政策形成之研究」，國立政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
    4. 莊春發（民國77年）：「獨占福利損失的理論與衡量」，台北市銀月刊，第19卷第八期，頁1-28。
    5. 梁發進譯（民國73年4月出版）：世界租稅名著翻譯叢書8「公共經濟學講座」上冊，Atkinson, A.B. and Stiglitz, J. E. 財政部財稅人員訓練所，頁342-345。
    6. 劉錦雄（民國77年）：「獨占的福利損失－我國台灣地區資料的驗證」，東吳大學經研所碩士論文。
    7. 鄭宗松（民國80年）：「競租、管制、隱蔽性賦稅、理論與實證」，國立政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
    8. 潘振民譯（民國80年8月初版）：「產業組織和政府管制」，Stigler, George. J著，五南圖書出版公司。


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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財政學系
    G80255025
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002004149
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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