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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 統計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/88351


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    題名: 不完全資訊下對局的探討
    作者: 張光華
    Chang, K.H.
    貢獻者: 李子壩
    張光華
    Chang,K.H.
    關鍵詞: 資訊
    信念
    型式
    共識
    共有p-信念
    Information
    Belief
    Type
    Common Knowledge
    Common p-belief
    日期: 1994
    1993
    上傳時間: 2016-04-29 15:30:46 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 對局理論的發展中，以往都著重於合作對局的探討與應用，且有相當的成
    參考文獻: [1] Aumann,Rober J.(1976)” Agreeing to Disagree.” ,Annals of Statistics,4,1236-1239.
    [2]Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sobel,Joel. (1987)” Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games.”,Econometrica, Vol.55,No.3,647-661.
    [3]Binmore,Kenneth. & Brandenberger,Adam. (1987)” Common Knowledge and Game Theory.” ,Disscussion Paper TE/88/167,STICERD,London Shool of Economics.
    [4]Brandenburger, A. & Dekel,E.(1987)” Common Knowledge with Probability 1.”, J.Math. Econ,16, 237-245.
    [5]Brandenburger, Adam.(1992)”Knowledge and Equilibrium in Games.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol .6,No.4,83-101.
    [6]Cho,In-Koo. & Sobel,Joel.(1990)”Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games.” ,Journal of Economic Theory,50,381-413.
    [7]Cho,In-Koo. & Kreps, David M.(1987)”Signaling Games and Stable Equilibrium.”, The Quarierly Journal of Economics,102,179-221.
    [8]Friedman, James.(1991) Game Theory with Application to Economics ,Second Edition, Oxford University Press.
    [9]Fudenberg,Drew.& Tirole,Jean.(1991)”Perfect Baysian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium.”, Journal of Economic Theory,53:236-260.
    [10]Fudenberg,Drew. & Tirole,Jean.(1993)Game Theory, Third Printing,The MIT Press.
    [11]Geanakopls,John.(1992)J” Common Knowledge.”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol.6, No.4,43-82.
    [12]Gibbons,Robert.(1992) A Primer in Game Theory, First Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
    [13]Glicksberg,I.L.(1952)” A further generalization of the Kakutani fixed point the-orem with application to Nash equilibrium points.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 38, 170-174.
    [14]Harsanyi,John.(1967)”Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Baysian’ Players 1,2,3.”, Management Science, 14,159-182, 320-334, and 486-502.
    ]15]Harsanyi,John.(1973)” Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: A new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points.”, International Journal of Game Theory,2,1-23.
    [16]Kohlberg,Elon.&Mertens,J.F. (1986)” On the Strategic Stability of Equilibrium. “ Econometrica, Vol.54, No.5, 1003-1037.
    [17]Kreps,David M.(1990) A Course in Microeconomic Theory, First Edition, Harvester Wheatsheaf.
    [18]Krep,D. & Wilson, R.(1982)” Sequential Equilibrium.”, Econometrica,50;863-894
    [19]Milgrom, P, & Weber, R.(1985)” Distributional strategies for games with incomplete information.”Mathematics of Operations Research,10,619-631.
    [20]Monderer,Dov. & Samet, Dov.(1989)”Approximating Common Knowledge with Common Beliefs.”, Games and Economic Beheavior, 1,170-190.
    [21]Myer, S & Majluf, N.(1984)” Corporate Financing and Investment Decision when Firms Have Information that Invsestors Do Not Have.”,Jouranl of Financial Economics,13:187-221.
    [22]Nash,J.(1950)”Equilibrium points in n-person games.”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,36,48-49.
    [23]Rasmusen, Eric.(1992) Games and Information, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press.
    [24]Rubinstein, A.(1989)”The Electronic Mail Game:Strategic Behavior under “Al-most Common Knowledge”.”,American Economic Review 79,385-391.
    [25]Selten,R.(1975)” Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games.”.International Journal of Game Theory,4:25-55.
    [26]Spence,A.M. (1973)” Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87,355-374.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    統計學系
    81354002
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#B2002003819
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[統計學系] 學位論文

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