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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/85402


    Title: 資本結構與代理問題－或有求償權評價法
    Capital Structure and Agency Problem－Contingent Claim Approach
    Authors: 黃星華
    Huang, Hsing-Hua
    Contributors: 廖四郎
    Liao, Szu-Lang
    黃星華
    Huang, Hsing-Hua
    Keywords: 資本結構
    代理成本
    次順位債券
    或有求償權評價法
    公司價值模型
    內生破產
    Capital Structure
    Agency Cost
    subordinated debt
    Contingent Claim Approach
    Firm Value Model
    Endogenous Bankruptcy
    Date: 2001
    Issue Date: 2016-04-18 16:28:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文立基於Merton(1974)或有求償權評價法及Leland(1994)內生破產資本結構模型上，加入次順位債券的考量，建立一個連續時間資本結構分析模型，量化的資本結構可作為企業融資之決策依據。內生破產行為與風險移轉行為都是股東與債權人之間可能產生的代理問題，本文的模型不但分析這兩種代理問題，更計算其所產生的代理成本。由模擬的結果發現內生破產成本雖然不大，但是其對無風險利率及公司非槓桿價值的波動度卻是非常的敏感。在本文的模型下，只要債務契約不能重新訂立，次順位債券的發行永遠都會降低優先債務的價值。在本模型中次順位債券的風險貼水比優先債券的風險貼水高；但是本文發現不管是優先債券或是次順位債券的風險貼水，當公司接近宣告破產時，公司非槓桿價值的波動度對兩種債券風險貼水的影響出現高風險低報酬的現象，可能的解釋理由如下：當公司接近宣告破產時，公司非槓桿價值波動度的增加使破產可能性提高，進而使風險貼水減少的間接力量大於波動度增加直接使風險貼水上升的力量。
    Based on Merton(1974) and Leland(1994), we construct a continuous-time capital structure model with subordinated debt. Quantitative results may serve the guidance of financial policy of the firm. Both endogenous bankruptcy and risk shifting behaviors are the agency problems between the equityholders and debtholders. Based on our model, the agency problems is considered and the agency costs are calculated. From the result of simulation, endogenous bankruptcy agency cost is small but sensitive to the volatility of unlevered asset value of the firm. Under renegotiation-proof, the senior debt is harmed by the issuance of the subordinated debt in our model. The risk premium of the subordinate debt is higher than that of the senior debt is confirmed by the model, however, when the firm is near bankruptcy, the behavior of "high risk high return" of both debts is reversed. The reason for the junk bond behavior may be explained as the negative effect of risk premiums due to the increase of the probability of bankruptcy is higher than the positive effect of the greater risk caused by higher volatility.
    Reference: (一)中文部分
    1. 邱淑芳, 民國81年6月, 以代理成本觀念探討資本結構決定因素, 國立交通大學管理科學研所未出版碩士論文.
    2. 紀景耀, 民國89年7月, 信用風險下可轉換公司債之評價, 國立政治大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文.
    3. 陳樹衡, 民國74年6月, 試論最適股權結構的決定因素-代理成本分析法的應用, 國立台灣大學經濟學研究所未出版碩士論文.
    4. 葉玉芳, 民國88年7月, 公司之債券融資策略-以台灣、美國公司為例, 國立中正大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文.
    5. 簡志昇, 民國87年6月, 台灣地區股票上市公司資本結構影響因素之研究, 國立交通大學管理學研究所未出版碩士論文.
    (二)英文部分
    1. Ammann, Manuel, 1999, Pricing Derivative Credit Risk, Springer.
    2. Anderson, Ronald and Suresh Sundaresan, 1996, Design and Valuation of Debt Contracts, Review of Financial Studies v9 n1, P37-68.
    3. Black, F., and M. S. Scholes, 1973, The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities, Journal of Political Economy 81, P637-654.
    4. Brennan, M., and E. Schwartz, 1978, Corporate Income Taxes, Valuation, and the Problem of Optimal Capital Structure, Journal of Finance 51, P103-114.
    5. ---------------, 1984, Optimal financial Policy and Firm Valuation, Journal of Finance 39, P593-607.
    6. ---------------, 1995, Corporate Finance Over the Past 25 Years, Financial Management 24, P9-22.
    7. Gordon, M. J., 1989, Corporate Finance Under the MM Theorems, Financial Management 1989 summer, P19-28.
    8. Harris, Milton, and Artur Raviv, 1991, The Theory of Capital Structure, Journal of Finance 44, P297-355.
    9. Ingersoll, J. E., 1987, Theory of Financial Decision Making, Rowman & Littlefield, Savage M.D.
    10. Jensen, M., and R. and W. Meckling, 1976 Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, P305-360.
    11. Leland, H. E., 1994, Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure, Journal of Finance 49, P1213-1252.
    12. ---------------, and K. B. Toft, 1996, Optimal Capital Structure, Endogenous Bankruptcy, and the Term Structure of Credit Spreads, Journal of Finance 51, P987-1019.
    13. ---------------, 1998, Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure, Journal of Finance 53, P1213-1243.
    14. Mella-Barral, Pierre and William P., 1997, Strategic Debt Service, Journal of Finance 1997 June, P531-556.
    15. Mello, A. S. and J.E. Parsons, 1992, Measuring the Agency Costs of Debt, Journal of Finance 47, P1887-1904.
    16. Merton, R. C., 1974, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates, Journal of Finance 2, P449-470.
    17. ---------------, 1977, On the Pricing Contingent Claims and the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, Journal of Financial Economics 5, P241-249.
    18. ---------------, 1990, Continuous Time Finance, 2nd Edition, Blackwell, Cambridge M.A.
    19. Miller, M. H., 1977, Debt and Taxes, Journal of Finance 1977 May, P261-275.
    20. Modigliani, F., and M. Miller, 1958, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, American Economic Review 48, P267-297.
    21. ---------------, 1963, Corporate Incomes Taxes and The Cost of Capital: A Correction, American Economic Review 1963 June, P433-443.
    22. Myers, S. C., 1977, Determinants of Corporate Borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics 5, P147-175.
    23. ---------------, 1984, The Capital Structure Puzzle, Journal of Finance 39, P575-592.
    24. ---------------, 2000, A Comparative Study of Structural Models of Corporate Bond Yields: An Exploratory Investigation, Journal of Banking and Finance 24, P255-269.
    25. Rubinstein, Mark and Eric Reiner, 1991, Breaking Down the Barriers, Risk 4, P28-35.
    26. Ziegler, Alexandre, 1999, A Game Theory Analysis of Options, Springer.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    88352002
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2002001545
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Money and Banking] Theses

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