| Abstract: | Clawbacks 係公司給予高階主管之薪酬合約中的特殊條款，規定若公司發生財務報表重 編時，得向高階主管追回已獲得之薪酬與紅利。這個條款早在2002 年美國Sarbanes-Oxley Act 第304 條中即有所規定，並責成SEC 負責向公司之CEO 與CFO 執行追討之任務。 最近通過的兩個法案更進一步提升了Clawbacks 的重要性，第一個為2008 年通過的 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act，強制要求所有進行問題資產交易之金融機構訂定 Clawbacks 條款；第二個為2010 年通過的Dodd–Frank Act，其中第954 條進一步要求全 美國所有上市櫃公司均需訂定Clawbacks 條款，並責成各公司之董事會負責執行該條款。 雖然美國許多非金融業的上市櫃公司在 Dodd–Frank Act 通過之前即已自動訂定 Clawbacks 條款，會計學術界對於該條款並無太多的研究。本研究試圖探討支付給高階 主管之權益薪酬是否會影響Clawbacks 條款的有效性。本研究預期Clawbacks 條款在支 付高階主管現金薪酬時，可能對於減少財務報表重編較為有效，其原因為Clawbacks 係 一直接之貨幣性懲罰，因此當公司發生財務報表重編時，高階主管必須要將所得之現金 繳回。然而，權益薪酬 (尤其是受限制股票與長期認股權) 對於Clawbacks 的有效性可 能會有截然不同的影響。一方面來說，因為高階主管無法自由地在短期內出售其股票或 行使其認股權，且該等股票及認股權之價值取決於公司未來之績效，高階主管可能有較 少之誘因進行盈餘管理。另一方面，由於受限制股票與長期認股權可能在公司發生財務 報表重編前，尚未實際轉換成現金，因此，並無法對高階主管形成直接之貨幣性懲罰。 更重要的是，受限制股票與長期認股權之「長期」的特性，可能進一步鼓勵高階主管進 行金額更龐大的跨年盈餘管理，以試圖維持或增加其股票與認股權之未來價值。整體而 言，權益薪酬對於Clawbacks 條款有效性之影響到底為何，實為一實證的問題。 本研究將首先探討自願性訂定 Clawbacks 條款是否會降低財務報表重編的可能性與管 理當局的盈餘管理，並進一步探討該條款之有效性是否會受到權益薪酬的影響。其次， 本研究將探討分析師預測之品質 (包含準確度與離散程度) 是否會因為Clawbacks 條款 所帶來盈餘品質的提升而有所變化，而該變化是否會受到權益薪酬的影響。 本研究對於審計文獻有下列三個貢獻：第一，本研究為首篇探討Clawbacks 條款的有效 性是否受到薪酬種類之影響；第二，本研究探討分析師是否會因為Clawbacks 條款而提 升其盈餘預測之品質；最後，本研究若發現權益薪酬對於Clawbacks 條款之有效性有負 面的影響，主管機關或有必要考慮對於權益薪酬之支付實務予以限制。
Clawbacks are compensation contract provisions that allow companies to recover bonuses previously awarded to executives in the event of subsequent restatements. These provisions were first introduced in Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which authorizes the SEC to enforce bonus recovery from CEOs and CFOs when restatements occur. Two recent Acts further reinforce the clawback provisions. The first one is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, which requires bonus recovery provisions for all financial institutions involving troubled asset transactions; the second one is Section 954 of the Dodd-Frank Act, which rules that all listed companies should have clawback provisions imposed on current or former executives prior to restatements, and designates companies’ boards of directors to enforce such provisions. While many listed companies other than financial institutions have voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions before the Dodd-Frank Act, only few unpublished auditing studies have examined different aspects of such provisions. My study differs from these studies in that I investigate whether equity compensation paid to the executives affects the effectiveness of clawbacks. I predict that clawback provisions are more likely to be effective when executives are compensated by cash. This is because clawbacks constitute a direct monetary penalty to the executives in that they have to pay cash back if restatements occur. In contrast, equity compensation, especially restricted stocks and long-term options, may affect the effectiveness of clawbacks in entirely different ways. On the one hand, since executives are prohibited from selling stocks or exercising options freely at any immediate time and their wealth depends on future performance, executives may have less incentive to manage earnings. On the other hand, restricted stocks and long-term options do not form a direct monetary penalty to the executives because it is possible that restatements occur before the stocks and options can be transferred into cash. Importantly, this “long-term” feature may further motivate executives to manage earnings to a larger extent over multiple years so that they can maintain or increase the future values of their stocks and options. Taken together, whether equity compensation enhances or weakens the effectiveness of clawbacks is ultimately an empirical question. I will first examine whether the voluntary adoption of clawback provisions reduces restatement likelihood and earnings management, and whether such reduction is affected by the amounts and portions of equity compensation. I will next examine whether more reliable earnings due to the clawbacks are associated with an improvement in analysts’ earnings forecasts. As far as the clawback provisions increase the reliability of earnings, I empirically test whether the accuracy and dispersion of analysts’ forecasts improve due to clawbacks and whether such improvements are subjected to the amounts and portions of different types of compensation. My study makes three contributions to the auditing literature. First, it provides a first step to examine whether the effectiveness of clawbacks in improving the quality of financial reporting is affected by companies’ compensation composition. Second, it investigates whether analysts can benefit from clawbacks in making forecasts that are more accurate and less dispersed. Finally, my empirical results may bear policy implication in that, if equity compensation weakens the efficacy of clawbacks, regulators may need to consider imposing restrictions on public firms’ use of such types of compensation. |
