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    题名: 企業併購最適支付方式契約設計
    作者: 朱建彥
    贡献者: 胡聯國
    朱建彥
    关键词: 企業併購
    代理問題
    雙方道德風險
    混合性支付方式
    線性契約
    Mergers & Acquisitions
    Principal-Agent Model
    Double-Sided Moral Hazard
    Mixed Payment
    Linear Contract
    日期: 2000
    上传时间: 2016-03-30 17:25:06 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 企業併購的成敗，基本上應視其併購的策略性目標是否達成，然而策略性的目標往往只能從收購後整體的營運績效或投資收益來進行評估。事實上，企業併購即是一種投資活動，投資後的環境變化事先即難以掌握，如何有效的預防企業併購的風險問題，尤為進行併購規劃時重要的課題。本文嘗試以「代理問題」來解釋企業併購完成後的「雙方道德風險問題」，希望利用支付方式的財務規劃，有效的對企業併購完成後的道德風險作防範。
    參考文獻: 中文部分：
    王泰允，「企業購併實用」，遠流出版社，民國80年初版。
    伍忠賢，「企業購併聖經」，遠流出版社，民國87年初版。
    潘隆政（民86），「企業併購支付方式影響因素之研究—台灣上市主併公司之研究」，淡江大學國際貿易學系碩士班論文。
    楊維君（民82），「台灣企業購併支付方式與財務特質關係之實證研究」，國立中央大學企業管理學系碩士班論文。
    常景翔（民81），「道德風險下公司的融資與投資行為」，國立清華大學經濟學研究所碩士班論文。
    戚務君（民85），「訊息操弄與多類型工作對誘因機制的影響」，國立台灣大學商學研究所博士班論文。
    （民85），「訊息不對稱下最適租賃契約之決定」，國立政治大學國際貿研究所碩士班論文。
    蕭玄逸（民80），「比例契約和偽報契約之分析—當事人-代理人模型之應用」，國立台灣大學經濟研究所碩士班論文。
    蕭黎明（民81），「台灣上市公司最高主管之報償、持股比例與公司績效之關係研究」，國立台灣大學財務金融研究所碩士班論文。
    英文部分：
    Al-Najjar, N. I., 1997, Incentive Contracts in Two-Sided Moral Hazards with Multiple Agents. Journal of Economic Theory 74: 174-195.
    Allen, D. W., and D. Lueck, 1995, Risk Preference and the Economics of Contracts. American Economic Review 62(December): 777-95.
    Bernard Salanie, 1998, The Economics of Contracts, The MIT Press.
    Bhattacharyya, S. and F. Lafontaine, 1995, Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of Shared Contracts. Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 26. No.4. (Winter): 761-781.
    Blackburn, Dark, and Hanson, 1997, Mergers, Method of Payment and Returns to Manager-and Owner-Controlled Firms. The Financial Review Vol. 32. No. 3 (August): 569-589.
    Brown, David, and Michael Ryngaert, 1991, The Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information, Journal of Finance 46, 653-669.
    Chang, S. , 1998, Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns, The Journal of Finance. Vol. LIII, No.2 (April): 773-784.
    Cheung , S. N. S., 1969, Transaction costs, Risk Aversion, and the Choice of Contractual Arrangement. The Journal of Law and Economics 12(1) (April):23-42.
    Coff, Russell W.,1999, How Buyers Cope with Uncertainty when Acquiring Firms in Knowledge-Incentive Industries: Cavest Emptor. Organization Science Vol. 10, (March-April): 144-161.
    Eckbo, B. Espen, Ronald M. Giammarino, and Robert L. Heinkel, 1990, Asymmetric Information and the Medium of Exchange in Takeovers: Theory and Tests. Review of Financial Studies 3, 651-675.
    Fishman, Michael, 1989, Preepptive Bidding and the Role of the Medium of Exchange in Acquisitions. Journal of Finance 44, 41-58.
    Hansen, Robert, 1987, A Theory of the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers and Acquisitions. Journal of Business 60, 75-95.
    Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1991, Multitask Principal-Agent Analysis : Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics and Organizations 7:24-52.
    Holmstrom, B. and P. Milgrom, 1994, The Firm as an Incentive System. American Economic Review 84(September): 972-991.
    Joel F. Houston and Michael D. Ryngaert, 1997, Equity Issuance and Adverse Selection: A Direct Test Using Conditional Stock Offers. The Journal of Finance Vol. LII, No.1(March): 197-219.
    Karmann, A., 1994, Multiple-Task and Multiple-Agent Models: Incentive Contracts and an Application to Point Pollution Control. Annals of Operations Research Vol.54, 57-78.
    Kim ,Son Ku and Wang Susheng, 1998, Linear Contracts and the Double Moral-Hazard. Journal of Economic Theory Vol.82 342-378.
    Luporini and Parigi, 1996, Multi-Task Sharecropping Contracts: the Italian Mezzadria. Economica Vol.63, 445-57.
    Martin, K. J. 1996, The Method of Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportunities, and Management Ownership. Journal of Finance Vol. LI. No.4.
    Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization and Management. Prentice-Hall.
    Romano, R. E. and S. Gupta, 1998, Monitoring the Principal with Multiple Agents. Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 29, No.2, 427-442.
    Saeyoung Chang, 1998, Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns. The Journal of Finance Vol. LIII, No. 2 (April): 773-784.
    Scott, J. H.,1997, On the Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, Journal of Finance, September , 1235-1250.
    Virginia L. Blackburn, Frederick H. Dark, and Robert C. Hanson, 1997, Mergers, Method of Payment and Returns to Manager- and Owner-Controlled Firms. The Financial Review Vol.32 No.3 (August): 569-589.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易學系
    86351004
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#A2002002040
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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