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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/81106


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    題名: 管理當局能力與強制性盈餘預測之關聯性-來自中國A股上市公司的實證分析
    The Relationship Between Managerial Ability and Mandatory Forecast: Evidence from China
    作者: 熊曦
    Xiong, Xi
    貢獻者: 金成隆
    Chin, Chen Lung
    熊曦
    Xiong, Xi
    關鍵詞: 管理當局能力
    強制性盈餘預測
    預測形態
    盈餘預測誤差
    市場反應
    Managerial Ability
    Mandatory Forecast
    Forecast Format
    Forecast Error
    Market Reaction
    日期: 2016
    上傳時間: 2016-02-03 11:16:19 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究以中國2007年至2013年盈餘預測的A股上市公司為主體。探討管理當局發佈強制性盈餘預測的預測形態、預測誤差以及市場反應與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測管理當局能力是否影響到其對於強制性盈餘預告門檻的規避以及對於來年發佈自願性業績預測的意願。
    實證的結果顯示管理當局能力越好其提供的強制性盈餘預測的形式越精準其預告資訊含量越多；再者，管理當局能力越好，其盈餘預測的誤差越低；實證結果也證明了市場對於能力較佳之管理當局所發佈的強制性盈餘預測的反應程度也較高。增額測試的結果顯示管理當局能力佳者盈餘品質較佳，具體表現為：相較於能力差的管理者，管理當局能力較好時不會通過盈餘管理去避免導因於產生增長50%或是下降50%而強制發佈盈餘預告的門檻。另外，管理當局能力越好，其在隔年度發佈自願性盈餘預測的幾率也越高。
    關鍵詞：管理當局能力、強制性盈餘預測、預測形態、盈餘預測誤差、市場反應
    This thesis focuses on mandatory forecast issued from 2007 to 2013 in China and investigate whether managerial ability is related to mandatory forecasts types, forecast error and market reaction. Additionally, this thesis also examines whether managerial ability decrease the likelihood to avoid mandatory forecast thresholds. Finally, whether the managerial ability will increase the probability of issuing voluntary forecasts in the following year is an interesting but unsolved issue; I will fill the gap.
    Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to issue mandatory forecasts in the more precise type. As for the accuracy, the mandatory forecasts issued by better managers tend to have less error. I also find that managerial ability can promotes the informativeness of management earnings forecasts for the public. Additionally, high ability managers are less likely to avoid the thresholds of mandatory forecasts. Furthermore, better managers are more likely to issue voluntary forecasts in the following year of mandatory forecasts.
    Key Words: Managerial Ability, Mandatory Earnings Forecast, Forecast Format, Forecast Error, Market Reaction.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計學系
    102353045
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1023530451
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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