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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77549


    Title: 論垂直相關市場中之整併策略:以互補要素模型分析
    Merger Decisions in Vertically Related Market with Complementary Inputs
    Authors: 謝宜庭
    Contributors: 溫偉任
    謝宜庭
    Keywords: 垂直整併決策
    賽局理論
    談判力
    雙互補要素
    Vertical Merger
    Game Theory
    Nash Bargaining
    Complementary Inputs
    Date: 2015
    Issue Date: 2015-08-17 14:06:55 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文利用互補要素模型分析垂直相關市場中之整併策略,並討論在不同談判力下之各種均衡市場結構。當下游廠商所需生產要素之一為獨賣要素,另一由寡占廠商生產時,下游廠商與上游非獨賣要素廠商將視整併後談判力保存程度大小與獨占要素廠商進行補貼與否而決定是否進行垂直整併,上游獨賣要素廠商則會經由比較整併一家下游廠商和任由其他廠商垂直整併所能獲得之利潤,決定在下游廠商談判力較大的情況下併購下游廠商。而當上游非獨賣要素廠商談判力極小或極大時,上游獨賣要素廠商與下游廠商整併亦較為有利。
    This research investigates merger decisions in a vertically-related market with two complementary intermediate inputs by using the Nash bargaining model. The production of final good involves two complementary inputs, exclusive inputs and commonly available inputs. The downstream firms and the oligopolistic upstream firms would merge if the preservation of bargaining power after merger is large enough or the monopolistic input supplier subsidizes them to do so. The monopolistic input supplier compares the gains of merging a downstream firm and the profit of letting other firms integrate. The monopolistic supplier would merge a downstream firm when the bargaining power of the downstream firms is large. Also, merging with a downstream firm becomes more profitable for the monopolistic supplier if the bargaining power of oligopolistic upstream firms is extremely small or extremely large.
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    尹慧中、陳昱翔、劉芳妙、湯淑君 (2015)。〈蘋果財測冷場 供應鏈照high〉,《經濟日報》,2013/07/24。
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    韓青秀 (2012)。〈In-cell面板良率低 恐成新一代iPhone出貨變數〉,2015年07月27日,取自http://www.maximavc.com。
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易研究所
    102351032
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102351032
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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