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    題名: 用虛擬機內省技術強化OpenStack雲端安全機制
    Enhancing OpenStack Cloud Security with Virtual Machine Introspection
    作者: 李彥亨
    Lee, Yen Heng
    貢獻者: 蔡瑞煌
    郁方

    Tsaih, Rua Huan
    Yu, Fang

    李彥亨
    Lee, Yen Heng
    關鍵詞: 虛擬機內省
    雲端安全
    惡意程式行為
    VMI
    Cloud Security
    Malware behavior
    日期: 2015
    上傳時間: 2015-08-03 13:21:02 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 如今,我們能夠受益於各式各樣的雲端服務(如Google及Amazon)全歸功於虛擬化技術的成熟。隨著雲端服務使用量的劇增,雲端安全的議題也不容忽視。傳統上使用網路型及主機型的入侵防衛系統來作雲端安全防護,但隨著虛擬化技術的發展,虛擬機內省機制為基底的防禦機制有著絕對於傳統入侵防衛系統優越的獨立性及可見度並逐漸成為主流的防禦機制。
    我們研究提倡的雲端防禦系統框架(VISO)便是以虛擬機內省機制為基底以及透過行為模式辨識的方式作惡意行為偵測且富有可擴增性,並強調所有的解決方案皆為開源的,也是為何我們以OpenStack作為我們的雲端環境防護系統的實驗環境。
    關於我們的實驗研究方法,我們採用監督式與非監督式的神經網路來作惡意程式行為分析。而所有惡意程式皆從官方OWL網站取得,並以防毒軟體作標籤的動作。目的是想要確認是否能夠透過同種類且已知的惡意程式行為模式去辨識出未知的同種類惡意程式行為。
    Today, we attributes it to virtualization technology that the application of cloud computing is so well-developed that the world-wide famous company can make use of this technique to reap the profits, just likes Google and Amazon etc. While cloud service bringing kinds of benefit to system vendors and cloud tenants, cloud security is exposed to many threats. Traditionally, two main kinds of intrusion detection system (IDS) are host-based IDS (HIDS) and network-based IDS (NIDS). With virtualization technology development, virtual machine monitor (VMM) based IDS is superior to HIDS and NIDS both on isolation and visibility properties as far as cloud security concerned.
    We address a cloud security protection framework, called Virtualization Introspection System for OpenStack (VISO), to strengthen OpenStack security defensive mechanism. VISO has some following characteristics. (1) VMI based monitoring mechanism (2) behavior-based analysis (3) elastic to expand system functionality and easy to operate (4) all apparatuses in VISO are free on Internet that is why we also choose the most famous private cloud solution, OpenStack, to deploying cloud environment.
    About our experiment method, we using supervised and unsupervised artificial technology algorithm to analyze behaviors monitored in a sandbox environment. All malwares are downloaded from OWL Taiwan official malware knowledge base and labeled by anti-virus scanner. The purpose is to see how effective the features of behaviors collected by VISO can recognize the same family malwares. Detecting unknown malware variants previously not recognized by commercial anti-virus software by training the same family known malware samples.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    資訊管理研究所
    102356044
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102356044
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[資訊管理學系] 學位論文

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