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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/77164


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    題名: 董監事暨重要職員責任保險與資訊不對稱之關聯性分析
    Directors` and Officers` Liability Insurance and Information Asymmetry
    作者: 黃隆建
    Hwang, Long Jainn
    貢獻者: 戚務君
    Chi, Wu Chun
    黃隆建
    Hwang, Long Jainn
    關鍵詞: 董監事暨重要職員責任保險
    資訊不對稱
    優勢資訊交易機率
    日期: 2015
    上傳時間: 2015-08-03 13:18:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究探討董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱：董監責任險)與資訊不對稱之間的關係。過去文獻關於購買董監責任險所獲得的利益以及所需付出的代價有許多的辯論。其中一種觀點認為購買董監責任險可以提供公司治理的監督機制以降低資訊不對稱程度，因此對股東有利。但是另一種觀點認為購買董監責任險會以減少董監事面臨訴訟時自己必須負擔的損失，因而可能會出現管理者機會主義行為而導致更多的道德風險問題。本研究採用股票市場中的優勢資訊交易機率(probability of information-based trading，簡稱PIN)當成企業資訊不對稱程度的直接衡量，以了解購買監責任險與資訊不對稱之間的關係。以2008年至2013年台灣上市公司為樣本之實證結果發現，整體而言，有購買董監責任險的公司，有較低的PIN值(也就是資訊不對稱程度較低)，基本上支持購買董監責任險確實可以提供公司治理的監督機制。然而在進一步比較有購買董監責任險公司以及沒有購買董監責任險的公司之後，結果顯示可能不太需要購買董監責任險的公司(以迴歸模型估計購買機率較低者)但實際上卻有購買時，相較於需要購買且實際上也有購買董監責任險的公司，會有相對比較高的PIN值(較高的資訊不對稱)。此結果顯示股票市場的PIN值確實會反應企業的投機行為，因此支持購買董監責任險依然會有出現道德風險問題的可能。本研究提供的證據顯示整體而言購買董監責任險具有公司治理的監督機制功能，但是道德風險問題還是可能會出現在某些購買董監責任險的企業。
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    95353504
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0953535043
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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