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Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/77024
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| Title: | 打預防針或提前引爆？盈餘預測，監理及風險傾向 |
| Other Titles: | Inoculation or Preignition? Earnings Forecasts, Governace and Risk Attitudes |
| Authors: | 何靜嫺 |
| Contributors: | 經濟學系 |
| Date: | 2013 |
| Issue Date: | 2015-07-28 15:23:49 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 大多數文獻研究經理人提供盈餘預測的誘因及動機. 且多數專注於分析經理人盈餘預測的資訊性及短期股價效果. 本文的重心在於經理人盈餘預測所造成的長期效果, 及是如何的所有權及薪資結構促使經理人提供造成不同長期效果的預測. 本計畫可望將盈餘預測的長期效果與所有權及薪資結構相連結, 因此, 預期將可填補不完全資訊模型與公司監理間的關係, 並可導出可供實證的結論來解釋所有權及薪資結構, 與經理人貢獻及盈餘預測的長期效果間的關係. 本文模型將說明所有權及薪資結構是導致經理人提供導致不同長期效果(打預防針或提前引爆)的預測的主因. 換言之, 與其他就行為角度來分析投資人過度或過少反應的文獻不同, 本文主張理性的經理人其實已經預見此長期效果之不同, 而刻意選擇造成不同長期效果的盈餘預測來獲取最高的經理人報償. A large amount of literature examines managers‘ incentives to provide earnings forecasts. Most studies focus on the informativeness of management forecasts and their short term reactions on stock prices. Our interest is in the long term impacts of management forecasts, as well as the compensation structures that motivate the managers to provide the forecasts that cause these different long term reactions. The linkage between compensation structure and the long term impacts of management forecasts will bridge the gap between signaling models and the corporate governance concerns about whether management disclosures are substitutes or complements to corporate governance. It also provides testable results that explain the relation between ownership structure, compensation, managerial effort, and the long term effects on stock prices. Our model will demonstrate that ownership and compensation structures are the main factors that motivate the managers to provide the forecasts that cause different long term reactions (inoculation or preignition). In other words, in contract to the large volume of works on addressing investors‘ behavioral reasons for over or under reactions, we assert that managers are actually aware of this difference in long term reactions, and they deliberately choose the forecasts that trigger different reactions to exploit the maximal benefit from managerial compensations. |
| Relation: | 計畫編號NSC102-2410-H004-054 |
| Data Type: | report |
| Appears in Collections: | [經濟學系] 國科會研究計畫
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Files in This Item:
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| 102-2410-H-004-054.pdf | | 624Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 140 | View/Open |
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