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Title:	立法院積極議程設定之理論與經驗分析：第二至第六屆
Authors:	邱訪義;李誌偉 Chiou, Fang-Yi;Lee, Zhih-Wei
Contributors:	政治學系
Keywords:	立法院;議程設定;分立政府;多數聯盟;藍綠共治
Date:	2012-06
Issue Date:	2015-07-20 12:03:21 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	當前用於解釋美國國會立法過程的立法理論，皆假定立法機構中存在一多數黨，且無法對多數黨在黨內同質性與黨際分化程度發生變動時的積極議程設定權提出明確的預測。針對僅有單一立法樞紐（即多數黨或聯盟）的台灣立法院，本文提出一個積極議程設定理論模型，解釋此立法樞紐在不同條件下的積極議程設定權與立法成功。本文預測多數聯盟施展積極議程設定權的能力會受到提案推動成本（例如聯盟席次大小、單一政黨或多黨組成多數聯盟）與提案優先性的影響。這些由本文模型推導出的假設，在過去的研究中皆未曾被提出。為了更嚴謹檢驗這些假設並獲得更穩固的經驗分析結果，我們蒐集第二至第六屆（1993-2007）所有的立法提案。本文的假設在經驗分析與質性探討中獲得很高程度的支持，顯示出多數聯盟的積極議程設定權相當程度上受到協商成本與提案優先性的影響。此外，有別於過去的經驗分析結果，本文發現分立政府並未對行政院提案通過與否造成不利的影響。這些結果對於我們在理解台灣立法僵局與行政立法關係上有很大啟示，同時也推翻過去對藍綠無法共治的刻板印象。 Existing legislative theories, which are developed to explain legislative dynamics in the U.S. Congress, presumes the existence of a majority party in a legislature and fails to provide predictions about positive agenda power of a majority under various degree of intra-party homogeneity and inter-party heterogeneity. Offering a theory of legislative majority coalition to explain its positive agenda power and proposal passage in the Taiwanese legislature, where only a single pivot exists, this paper hypothesizes that a majority coalition`s ability to exert its positive agenda power depends on passage costs (e.g., a majority coalition formed by a single party or multiple parties and the size of a majority coalition) and priority of its proposals. We collect all the legislative proposals raised from the second through the sixth term (i.e., 1993-2007) to obtain more robust empirical results and examine the hypotheses derived from our model. Our empirical and qualitative analyses render strong support for all of our hypotheses. Moreover, in contrast to previous empirical findings, we find that divided government does not have any significant impact on government proposals. This finding has profound implications for our understanding of legislative gridlock and the legislative-executive relationship in Taiwan.
Relation:	台灣政治學刊,16(1),1-58
Data Type:	article
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Political Science] Periodical Articles

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