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    题名: 薪酬委員會設置對家族企業之影響
    The Impact of Compensation Committee on the Relationship between Family Firms
    作者: 翁郁媚
    Weng, Yu Mei
    贡献者: 戚務君
    翁郁媚
    Weng, Yu Mei
    关键词: 薪酬委員會
    公司價值
    家族企業
    Compensation Committee
    firm value
    family firms
    日期: 2015
    上传时间: 2015-07-13 11:05:50 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 為強化公司治理，我國強制上市(櫃)公司須於2011年底前設置薪酬委員會，本研究首先探討公司自願在2011年底前設置薪酬委員會之因素。因為法令還未強制設置薪酬委員會前，我國已自願設置薪酬委員會之公司約2%，無法使用差異中之差異法(Difference-in-difference)，故本研究以我國家族企業為研究對象，探討相較於非家族企業，薪酬委員會設置對家族企業之公司價值的影響。
    本研究結果顯示產業龍頭公司有設置薪酬委員會、公司規模、股東權益報酬率及董事會之獨立性與自願設置薪酬委員會呈現正相關。另外，家族企業相較於非家族企業而言公司價值較低，設置薪酬委員會後公司價值差距變小，但是未達統計上的顯著，亦即，設置薪酬委員會對家族企業的效益及非家族企業的效益沒有顯著差異。
    In order to enhance corporate governance, the R.O.C. Securities and Exchange Act was amended in 2010 to force listed companies to establish a Compensation Committee by the end of 2011. First, this study is to investigate which determinants may encourage companies to voluntarily establish the compensation committee. Then, we investigate whether setting compensation committee or not can increase firm value in family firms more than non-family firms. Because of few volunteers, we can’t use difference-in-difference.
    The results implicate that voluntary formation of compensation committee is associated with leading enterprise in industry which establishes compensation committee, greater size of the firms, higher return on equity and higher independence of the board of directors. In addition, on comparing Compensation Committees established or not, there appears to be no significant correlation with firm value between family firms and non-family firms.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    102353025
    103
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102353025
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[會計學系] 學位論文

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