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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/76247


    Title: 政治連結對於新創企業公開發行的影響： 以台灣創業投資產業為例
    Political connections under the IPO process of new ventures: Evidence from Taiwanese venture capital industry
    Authors: 黃敬堡
    Huang, Jing Bao
    Contributors: 李文傑
    王信實
    Lee, Wen Chieh
    Wang, Shinn Shyr
    黃敬堡
    Huang, Jing Bao
    Keywords: 創業投資
    政治連結
    初次公開發行 (IPO)
    研發效率
    台灣
    Venture Capital
    Political connections
    Initial public offerings (IPO)
    Innovative Efficiency
    Taiwan
    Date: 2014
    Issue Date: 2015-07-01 14:59:48 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本研究探討政治連結如何成為創業投資產業中資訊傳遞的橋樑，其中政治連結的指標分別由新創企業和創投董監事的教育背景，是否和國家發展基金委員會成員的教育背景有關係來定義。實證結果顯示政治連結透過不同的緊密程度對新創企業公開發行的里程碑造成影響。透過梳理過去發生在台灣的創投投資案記錄，本研究發現創投名聲和企業的研發效率對企業的初次公開發行有正面的影響。另外，政治連結在新創企業公開發行的里程碑上，扮演著相當有趣的角色。企業自身的政治連結確實有助於企業達到初次公開發行的里程碑；然而，創投的政治連結卻對企業的初次公開發行有負面的影響。
    This paper investigates how the political connections work on information dissemination in venture capital markets. The political connections are formed among new ventures, venture capitals measured by whether their directors or supervisors have the same educational backgrounds as those of the Taiwanese National Development Fund (NDF) board members. The political connection is hypothesized to affect the entrepreneurial Initial Public Offering (IPO) milestone in different connection settings. By using Taiwanese domestic venture capital investment records, this paper shows how reputation, firm innovative efficiency and political connections have impacts on the startup’s IPO. While the reputation and firm innovative efficiency are positively correlated with the probability of firm’s IPO, the political connections play a significant but tricky role in the entrepreneurial IPO milestone. Specifically, firms’ political connections affect their IPO milestone positively; however, venture capitals’ political connections are adversely related with the probably of the IPO milestone.
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    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    102258029
    103
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0102258029
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Economics] Theses

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