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| Title: | 企業高薪低報對台灣勞保退休年金及經濟成長影響之分析
An Investigation of the Influence of Enterprises Underreporting Wage upon Labor Insurance Retirement Annuity and Economic Growth |
| Authors: | 陳冠彰 |
| Contributors: | 毛維凌
Mao, Wei Lin
陳冠彰 |
| Keywords: | 勞保退休年金
高薪低報
隨收隨付制
勞保費率
所得替代率
經濟成長
企業獨占力
個人所得稅
Labor insurance retirement annuity
Underreporting wage
Pay-as-you-go system
Labor insurance premium rate
Income replacement rate
Economic growth
enterprise monopoly power
personal income tax |
| Date: | 2014 |
| Issue Date: | 2015-03-02 10:16:57 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 文建構一個具有內生成長特性的跨期替代模型，並假設勞保制度在隨收隨付制度（Pay-as-You-Go System）下，分析企業高薪低報的行為對於勞保退休年金與經濟成長之影響。另外研究政府實施勞保政策時，對於經濟成長、所得替代率與勞保退休年金總額所帶來之衝擊。此為本文的第一個主題；研究發現提高勞保費率將造成企業薪資低報的行為更為嚴重，不利於經濟成長；而且調高勞保費率可能會降低勞保退休年金的總額。此外，薪資低報成本相似於逃稅成本，較低的薪資低報成本有助於提高經濟成長，增加所得替代率，但反將導致勞工的勞保退休年金總額減少。至於有關懲罰雇主高薪低報的策略，分別有稽查機率與懲罰率兩種，加強稽查或加重懲罰均使得經濟成長率與所得替代率下跌，但是卻都有利於增加勞工的勞保退休年金之累積，而且懲罰率策略在增加勞保退休金方面之效率會高於加強勞保稽查策略。
本文第二個主題將廠商部分修改成不完全競爭市場，並且納入個人所得稅，來探討企業獨占力對於勞保年金制度的影響。研究發現：(1) 獨占力與薪資低報成本為正相關的情形下。大部分企業獨占力與經濟成長呈現正相關，但如果獨占力偏小會有負相關的狀況出現。較高的企業獨占力，將使勞保所得替代率下跌，但對於勞工最後領取的勞保年金影響則是不確定的。；(2)在個人所得稅部分，本文發現個人所得稅上升不利於經濟成長，但其影響力道會隨薪資申報率降低而減少；(3)個人所得稅提高將使勞保年金的所得替代率下降，但薪資申報率對其效果影響並不大；(4)個人所得稅上升將導致勞保年金總額減少，但較低的薪資申報率使其下降速度減緩；(5)重新檢視勞保費率部分，發現勞保費率對於經濟成長的影響，會因個人所得稅率的不同，有不一樣的結果。此點與前文的結論有所不同。
In this paper we build an endogenous growth in an overlapping generations (OLG) model with a pay-as-you-go labor insurance system to analyze the impact of employer under-report employees’ income on the labor insurance retirement annuity and the economic growth. We also investigate the effects of government policies on the economic growth, income replacement rate and total amount of labor insurance annuity. It is the first topic in this paper. Research finds that the increase of labor insurance premium rate has negative effect on economic growth because it will cause an increasing tendency of employees to under-report employees’ income. Besides, an increasing in labor insurance premium rate may reduce the total amount of labor insurance retirement annuity. In addition, the cost of underreporting wage is similar to cost of tax evasion. The lower cost of underreporting wage can contribute to economic growth and increase income replacement rate, however, it will result in a decrease in amount of labor insurance retirement annuity. There are two government policies used to punish the employers who under-report the wage include detection probability and punishment rate, both policies have positive effects on labor insurance retirement annuity. Furthermore, the efficiency of punishment rate is better than detection probability.
The second topic, we will modify firm model to imperfectly competitive and adding personal income tax to analyze the impact of enterprise monopoly power on the labor insurance retirement annuity and economic growth. The researched results indicate: (1) In the situation that monopoly power is positive relationship to the cost of underreporting wage, we find that the most is positive relationship between enterprise monopoly power and economic growth, but the smaller enterprise monopoly power may have negative relationship. The higher enterprise monopoly power will result in a decrease in income replacement rate, but it is uncertain for influence on labor insurance retirement annuity; (2) In the part of personal income tax, research finds that an increase in personal income tax has negative effect on economic growth, but the impact has to reduce with the decrease of wage reporting rate; (3) A raise of personal income tax will reduce income replacement rate of labor insurance retirement annuity, but the power not be affected by wage reporting rate; (4) A raise of personal income tax will reduce amount of labor insurance retirement annuity, but lower wage reporting rate will slow down its speed of reducing; (5) Reviewing the part of labor insurance premium rate, we find that influence of labor insurance premium rate on economic growth are different from result with difference of personal income tax. This point is different from result of the first topic.
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| Description: | 博士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
97258507
103 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0972585071 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [經濟學系] 學位論文
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