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| Title: | 戰後國共和談──從重慶會談到整軍方案 |
| Other Titles: | Postwar Peace Negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party: From the Chungking Talks to the Army Reorganization Plan |
| Authors: | 蔣永敬
Chiang, Yung-ching Chiang |
| Contributors: | 歷史學系 |
| Keywords: | 國共和談;蔣介石;毛澤東;馬歇爾;周恩來
KMT-CCP peace negotiations;Chiang Kai-shek;Mao Zedong;George Marshall;Chou En-lai |
| Date: | 2012-12 |
| Issue Date: | 2015-01-12 10:57:35 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 對日抗戰後的中國國民黨和中國共產黨的和平談判，從 1945 年 8 月重慶會談，到 1946 年 10 月國軍進占張家口前後的會談，可分為三個階段，第一階段為 1945 年 8-10 月的重慶會談，第二階段為 1946 年 1 月政治協商到 6 月的東北休戰，第三階段為自同年 7-10 月邊打邊談。第一階段是國共直接談判，沒有結果，打了三個月內戰；第二階段各黨派協商，得到結果，則被推翻；第三階段談判成為煙幕，實際上大打，證明談判失敗。從重慶會談共方提出「擁護蔣主席之領導地位」，到最後談判失敗，毛澤東提出「打倒蔣介石工作」，其間談判，過程曲折，經緯萬端。本文先就重慶會談毛澤東志在華北與東北、停戰協議美助蔣介石先圖關外、政治協商結果國共反應不同、整軍方案中共另有「暗盤」等四項問題進行探討。戰後國共和談，從重慶會談到整軍方案的簽訂，前後折衝為時半年（從1945 年 8 月 28 日到 1946 年 2 月 25 日）。其間雖經波折，但整體而言，國共雙方尚能本諸互讓互諒精神，終於達成三大協議：停戰協議、政治協商五大決議案、整軍方案。這些協議後來雖然未能實現，但在當時確為各方所肯定，亦為戰後中國帶來「和平統一」的曙光。同時國共雙方對此協議均有實現的意願和承諾。但其結果，則是相反。原因何在？爭論至多，此為值得檢討的問題。惟國共雙方各將破壞和平的責任，歸諸對方；負責調處的馬歇爾則認為責在國共雙方，在其調處失敗後離華的聲明中，認為「和平之最大障礙，乃中國共產黨及國民黨彼此所懷之完全而幾乎具有壓倒力量之懷疑心理。」最近交涉之所以失敗，其原因：在國民黨方面，存在一有力量之「反動派」，對其所作各種努力均加反對。共產黨方面，亦有「過激分子」，絕不猶疑使用激烈之手段，以求達到目的，例如破壞交通，以求摧毀中國之經濟，便於造成推翻政府或使其崩潰的形勢，而不顧及中國人民因此所受之苦痛。以上各自表述，皆有所本，足見以上三大協議的失效原因，並非單純，而是多方面的。但最重要的原因，則為美、蘇兩強在華的角力，加劇了國共的衝突；特別是馬歇爾所主導的停戰協議，改變了蔣介石「先安關內、再圖關外」的決策，使蔣先圖關外，造成中、蘇關係的惡化。致蔣氏處理東北問題，陷於困境，關外既未圖成，關內更不能安。國共的和解，為之落空。
In the wake of the Anti-Japanese War, the peace negotiations between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) had three stages: the first began with direct bilateral talks in Chongking from August to October, 1945, followed by the second one on the convocation of the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) in January 1946 resulting in the Manchurian ceasefire agreement, and the third one was reconvened from July to October when the KMT army seized Zhangjiajie. The first stage bore no fruit but a three-month war; while the second stage witnessed the results produced in the first were simply overturned; as to the last stage, it turned out to be doomed to failure as a smokescreen of violent battles. The whole series of peace talks underwent a circuitous and complex process, revealing the CCP called for “supporting Chairman Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership” in Chungking on the one hand, and Mao Zedong declared “the task of overthrowing Chiang” towards the end on the other. This paper explores four relevant issues: Firstly, Mao’s target at North and Northeast China through Chungking talks; secondly, the ceasefire agreement generated by the U.S. acknowledging Chiang’s armed forces to take over Northeast China; thirdly, the discrete responses from the KMT and CCP to the PCC resolutions; and fourthly, the CCP’s “hidden agenda” in the army reorganization plan. Mainly in a spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, the six-month KMT-CCP talks from August 28, 1945 to February 25, 1946 reached on three major agreements: a general truce, the PCC five resolutions, and the army reorganization plan. Despite the eventual failure to implement the agreements, they were largely approved and shed light on China’s unification. Both the KMT and the CCP were willing to commit themselves at that time. What led to the opposite outcome is well-worth a close examination. The two parties blamed each other for the breakdown of the agreements. In the statement issued upon his departure from China, the U.S. special envoy General George Marshall claimed, “The greatest obstacle to peace has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang regard each other.” The crucial factors involved, as Marshall indicated, were bilateral: On the side of the KMT, a dominant group of reactionaries was opposed to almost every effort; on the side of the CCP, some “radicals” never hesitated to gain their end by the most drastic measures. Regardless of the costs in the sufferings to the Chinese people, the Communists counted on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the government, as accelerated, for instance, by guerilla actions against traffic. Given that all of the above points of view could somehow be justified by respective parties involved in their deadly struggle, there arguably existed sophisticated, multifaceted reasons for the breakdown of the three major agreements. However, the most important factor of all should be the confrontation between the two superpowers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union, which exacerbated the KMT-CCP conflict. The Marshall mission succeeded in persuading Chiang to fight his way into the Northeast, leading to the deterioration of the KMT-Soviet relations. This arguably gravest decision blunder came to haunt Chiang for the rest of his life, for it was in the Northeast that his troops fell and the strongest cause for reaching the KMT-CCP reconciliation was finally and irretrievably lost. |
| Relation: | 國史館館刊, 34, 115-155 |
| Data Type: | article |
| Appears in Collections: | [歷史學系] 期刊論文
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Files in This Item:
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Size | Format | |
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| 115-155.pdf | | 492Kb | Adobe PDF2 | 772 | View/Open |
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