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    题名: The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path
    作者: Joe Chen;Joseph E. Harrington Jr.
    贡献者: 財政系
    日期: 2007.03
    上传时间: 2014-11-04 18:10:27 (UTC+8)
    摘要: Previous research exploring the effect of corporate leniency programs has modeled the oligopoly stage game as a Prisoners` Dilemma. Using numerical analysis, we consider the Bertrand price game and allow the probability of detection and penalties to be sensitive to firms` prices. Consistent with earlier results, a maximal leniency program necessarily makes collusion more difficult. However, we also find that partial leniency programs—such as in the U.S.—can make collusion easier compared to offering no leniency. We also show that even if cartel formation is not deterred, a leniency program can reduce the prices charged by firms.
    關聯: The Political Economy of Antitrust, CEA 282, 59-80, Elsevier Science
    数据类型: book/chapter
    DOI 連結: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82003-1
    DOI: 10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82003-1
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 專書/專書篇章

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