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Title:	考慮利潤移轉效果之租稅競爭
Other Titles:	Capital Tax Competition in the Presence of Rent-Shifting Incentives
Authors:	賴育邦 Lai, Yu-Bong
Contributors:	財政系
Keywords:	租稅競爭;公共財;利潤移轉效果 Tax competition;Public goods;Profit-shifting effect
Date:	2006.05
Issue Date:	2014-11-03 14:59:05 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	在典型的租稅競爭模型中，財貨市場為完全競爭，因此不會出現利潤移轉效果。本文將假設財貨市場為雙佔市場，並分析利潤移轉效果的出現將對國際間的資本稅競爭產生何種影響。本文建構一個兩階段賽局，在第二階段，兩個出口國的廠商在第三國市場進行數量或價格上的競爭。在第一階段，出口國則決定該國的資本稅稅率。在此架構下，出口國政府在決定稅率時，會試圖利用資本稅以移轉對手國的利潤，換言之，資本稅具有策略性貿易政策之性質。本文發現，當廠商進行數量競爭時，利潤移轉效果會使公共財提供過少的情況加劇；在價格競爭下，利潤移轉效果則會改善公共財提供過少的情況。本文進一步指出，在數量競爭下，出口國相互合作可增進彼此的福利；然而在價格競爭下，出口國的合作有可能使雙方的福利下降。 The tax competition literature usually specifies competitive product markets, so that the rent-shifting effect is overlooked. By incorporating an duopolistic product market, this paper considers two exporting countries that use capital taxes as devices to promote exports in a two-stage game. We find that when firms compete in terms of quantity, the rent-shifting effect aggravates the under-provision of public goods. However, when firms compete in terms of price, the rent-shifting effect reduces the inefficiency arising from tax competition. Moreover, we show that cooperation between exporting countries enhances the welfare of both countries in a Cournot duopoly, but this is not necessarily true in a Bertrand duopoly.
Relation:	Taipei Economic Inquiry (經濟研究), 42(1), 1-24.
Data Type:	article
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Public Finance] Periodical Articles

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