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    Title: 論企業共同開發完成後之專利權共有
    Other Titles: Joint-Development and the Resulted Patent Co-Ownership--An Analysis from the Perspectives of Law and Economics
    Authors: 侯慶辰
    Hou, Ching-Cheng
    Contributors: 智財所
    Keywords: 共同開發;專利權共有;應有部份;共有之專利權;授權;讓與;交易成本;賽局理論;公共財的悲劇
    Joint development;Undivided partial interests;Co-owned patent;Transfer;License;Transaction cost;Game theory;Tragedy of the commons
    Date: 2009.04
    Issue Date: 2014-10-06 17:23:20 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 近年來科技產業由於研發投入日漸高漲,企業間為降低投資風險且達到合縱連橫之目的,盛行所謂共同開發(joint-development; co-development)的模式,即雙方(或多方)約定共同出資並以技術互補的方式分工合作完成開發任務,以產生具產業上價值之智慧財產(IP)為目標,最後雙方共同分享開發的智慧財產所帶來的經濟利益。在實務上這種共同開發契約常約定未來產生的專利權由共同開發的雙方共有(co-owner)並共同提出申請,在假設此種合約的準據法為中華民國法律的前提下,這種智慧財產權共有的模式會衍生諸多法律與商業問題,此即為本文所欲分析與討論之主題,而本文也將分成商業面(特別是經濟分析)與法律面分別切入探討。\\r本文首先定義專利權共有並將之定性為民法上的分別共有民法上的分別共有之一種特殊類型。其次本文區別應有部分與共有之專利本身二者而分別討論其中的法律問題,就前者本文特別點出現行法漏未規定應有部分得否授權他人之問題;就後者本文點出專利共有與職務發明可能衝突之問題,且本文主張企業以外包方式委託他企業生產製造專利產品(OEM)時應視為企業自己實施專利而無得到他共有人同意之必要。最後本為引用經濟理論認為共有專利為少數共有人對某技術市場之壟斷(Monopoly),故符合經濟學上所謂「寡占」(Oligopoly)之定義。本文並引用經濟分析上常見之交易成本、賽局理論與公共財的悲劇等理論加以分析,結論上大多得出共有專利易於破局此一悲觀的看法。總之,本文認為共有專利一事在法律上問題複雜,法律上應嚴設規定(要件、效果、權能與分割等),並須在政策上思考是否應獎勵共有,目前我國法律準用民法共有物之規定有許多扞格不合之處,此體現了立法者未認識到無體權利與有體物有許多本質上之差異。
    This article particularly aims to analyze the patent co-development and co-ownership model from the perspective of law and economics. As the costs for research and development drastically rise recently, it is a very popular business model in industry that two or more companies corroborate with each other in order to jointly develop certain new technology so that they can diversify the risks for success uncertainty and reduce each costs for new technology development. According this business model, two companies may establish a joint venture. They may agree to proportionally contribute to raising capital required for product development, they may transfer technology and know-how to each other, and they may work together to develop certain technology pursuant to the contemplated development project. If the development is successfully completed, usually they will share the fruit, i.e. co-owning the intellectual property (IP) generated and jointly enjoy the economic profits resulted from such new IP. This phenom non has practical importance that deserves scholar’s attention.In the beginning of this article, I define the term of patent co-ownership, and I argue that with regard to the question of term classifications patent co-ownership shall be clarified as co-ownership but not owners-on-common in Civil Code; the latter is a remnant in law. Second, I distinguish the concept of undivided partial interests from that of co-owned patents. Regarding the former issue, I think it is a legal loophole in Patent Act that it did not make rules regarding that co-owner licenses out its undivided partial interests. Regarding the latter issue, I point out that co-ownership may be in conflict with employee’s invention set forth in Patent Act, and in my humble opinion, I argue that subcontracting for manufacture shall not be regarded as license under Patent Act so that every co-owner can freely do so without other co-owner’s prior consent. Finally, I argue that patent co-ownership is the Oligopoly in Economics, and I analyze this by reference to common economic theories with respect to transaction cost, game theory and tragedy of the commons. I then obtain a negative hypothesis that most co-ownership in patent arrangements will eventually fail due to deception by one party or both.
    Relation: 政大智慧財產評論, 7(1), 23-42
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[科技管理與智慧財產研究所] 期刊論文
    [智慧財產評論] 期刊論文

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