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政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 國際經營與貿易學系 > 學位論文 > Item 140.119/70329

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/70329

Title:	論科諾寡占中之垂直整併促成:以互補要素模型分析 Vertical Merger Facilitation in Cournot Oligopolies with Complementary Inputs
Authors:	陳畊嘉 Chen, Keng Chia
Contributors:	溫偉任 Wen, Wei Jen 陳畊嘉 Chen, Keng Chia
Keywords:	垂直整併產業結構賽局理論科諾寡占雙互補要素補貼 Vertical Integration Industry Structure Game Theory Cournot Oligopolies Complementary Inputs Subsidy
Date:	2013
Issue Date:	2014-10-01 13:43:33 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本文利用互補要素模型分析科諾寡占市場之垂直整併誘因，並討論模型中存在的各種均衡市場結構。當上游的中間財一由獨占廠商生產，另一由寡占廠商生產時，獨占的中間財生產者的利潤會隨著垂直整併廠商家數增加而增加。其原因在於垂直整併廠商消除了雙重加價而降低生產成本，從而增加均衡產量並衍生對獨占的中間財之需求。由於獨占中間財廠商可以從其他廠商的垂直整併獲利，它甚至有誘因貼補其他廠商以促成垂直整併，使得產業均衡結構變成完全整併。本文亦支持垂直整併會促進效率的論點，並當有獨占勞工工會存在時，廠商進行產業垂直整併後會使得勞工工資上漲。因此本文結果可對反托拉斯法的垂直整併管制提供多元政策意涵，並對多要素投入的垂直相關市場有更全面的市場結構預測。 The equilibrium industry structure is investigated in this research by using a complementary input model highlighting the vertical integration incentives in a Cournot successive oligopolistic market. The upstream input markets composed of a monopolist and N oligopolists would exhibit the increasing monopolistic rent as more vertically-integrated firms emerge in the market. This equilibrium is sustained by the production boosting outcome resulting from the circumvention of the double marginalization problem for the vertically-integrated producers which in turn drives up the derived demand toward the solely supplied upstream input. The more vertically-integrated firms in a market, the more profits a monopolist gains. There is an incentive for it to subsidise vertical integration. The result here also supports the efficiency-improving and the wage-increasing result stemming from the larger output and lower price in the final goods market after the vertical integration. This paper would shed some light on the antitrust regulation over the vertical integration in vertically-related markets composed of multiple complementary inputs.
Reference:	[1]Bork, R. H. (1978), “The antitrust paradox: A policy at war with itself. ” [2]Chen, Y. (2001), “On vertical mergers and their competitive effects”, RAND Journal of Economics, 667–685. [3]Gaudet, G. and Long, N. (1996), “Vertical integration, foreclosure, and profits in the presence of double marginalization”, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 5(3), 409–432. [4]Hart, O., Tirole, J., Carlton, D. W., and Williamson, O. E. (1990), “Vertical integration and market foreclosure”, Brookings papers on economic activity, Microeconomics, 205–286. [5]Hecking, H. and Panke, T. (2014), “Quantity-setting oligopolies in complementary input markets-the case of iron ore and coking coal”, Technical report, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln. [6]Joskow, P. L. (1985), “Vertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coalburning electric generating plants”, JL Econ. and Org., 1, 33. [7]Lee, W. C. and Wen, W. J.(2011), “Endogenous Vertical Industrial Structure in a Successive Oligopolistic Entry Game”. [8]Matsumura, T. and Ogawa, A. (2012), “Price versus quantity in a mixed duopoly”, Economics Letters, 116(2), 174–177. [9]Matsushima, N. and Mizuno, T. (2012), “Equilibrium vertical integration with complementary input markets”, The BE Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 12(1). [10]――――――――(2013), “Vertical separation as a defense against strong suppliers”, European Journal of Operational Research, 228(1), 208–216. [11]Ordover, J. A., Saloner, G., and Salop, S. C. (1990), “Equilibrium vertical foreclosure”, The American Economic Review, 127–142. [12]Reisinger, M. and Tarantino, E. (2013), “Vertical integration with complementary inputs”. [13]Salinger, M. A. (1988), “Vertical mergers and market foreclosure”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(2), 345–356. [14]Shy, O. (1995), “Industrial organization: theory and applications”, MIT press. [15]Wang, K.-C., Koo, H.-W., and Chen, T.-J. (2005), “Strategic buying or selling?: The behavior of vertically-integrated firms in the intermediate goods market”, Journal of Economic Integration, 20(2), 366–382. [16]Zhao, L. (2001), “Unionization, vertical markets, and the outsourcing of multinationals, Journal of International Economics”, 55(1), 187–202. [17]長內厚(2012),“鴻海加夏普電視殺價戰才正要開始！ ”, 台北: 今周刊815 期。 [18]陈若冰(2013),“《图话》：“废城”底特律”, 北京: 騰訊新聞。 50
Description:	碩士國立政治大學國際經營與貿易研究所 101351029 102
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101351029
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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