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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 財務管理學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/69440
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/69440


    Title: 台灣高科技產業CEO薪酬結構與購併績效之相關性
    The Relationship between CEO`s Compensation Structure and M&A Performance of Hightech Industry in Taiwan
    Authors: 藍晉委
    Contributors: 顏錫銘
    藍晉委
    Keywords: 購併
    薪酬結構
    代理問題
    M&A
    Compensation structure
    agency problem
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-09-01 13:45:29 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 本文藉由研究2006年至2013年台灣高科技產業公司所做的購併案,探討主併公司CEO薪酬結構與購併績效間的關係。
    2008年金融海嘯過後,「肥貓」一詞被廣泛的討論著,原因是美國的一些大企業在接受政府抒困的同時,仍領取高薪。台灣或許沒有像美國一樣需要藉由政府抒困來幫助瀕臨倒閉的企業,但卻存在著企業獲利與經理人薪酬不成正比的現象。因此本研究2006年至2013年台灣高科技產業公司所做的購併案,以購併案宣告日當天主併方的異常報酬率作為衡量經理人績效的標準,並計算主併方經理人的薪酬結構,探討兩者間的關係。
    本研究發現,主併方購併宣告日前一天至購併宣告日當天的累積異常報酬率與主併方CEO的薪酬結構間存在著正向並且顯著的關係。薪酬結構的係數為0.01326且顯著,表示當其他條件不變,薪酬結構變數每上升一單位,主併方購併累積異常報酬率會上升1.326%。本文對此現象的解釋為,由於主併方CEO的薪酬結構中,來自股票的薪酬比例越高,CEO與股東間的利益越一致,降低代理問題發生的可能性,有助於公司價值的提升。本文另外將事件窗口改為主併方購併宣告日前兩天至購併宣告日當天,結果與事件窗口為主併方購併宣告日前一天至購併宣告日當天相似。
    Reference: 一、英文文獻
    Asquith, et al. (1983). "The Gains to Bidding Firms from Merger." Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 11: 121-139.

    Blackwell, D. W., et al. (2007). "Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover." Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting Vol. 29: 315-338.

    Chang (1998). "Takeovers of Privately Held Targets, Methods of Payment, and Bidder Returns." The Journal of Finance Vol. 53: 773-784.

    Cloodt, M., et al. (2006). "Mergers and acquisitions: Their effect on the innovative performance of companies in high-tech industries." Research policy Vol. 35: 642-654.

    Datta, S., et al. (2005). "Executive Compensation Structure and Corporate Equity Financing Decisions*." The Journal of Business Vol. 78: 1859-1890.

    Fuller, K., et al. (2002). "What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions." The Journal of Finance Vol. 57: 1763-1793.

    Grinstein, Y. and P. Hribar (2004). "CEO compensation and incentives: Evidence from M&A bonuses." Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 73: 119-143.

    Hagedoorn, J. and G. Duysters (2002). "The effect of mergers and acquisitions on the technological performance of companies in a high-tech environment." Technology Analysis & Strategic Management Vol. 14: 67-85.

    Hayward, M. L. and D. C. Hambrick (1997). "Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris." Administrative Science Quarterly Vol.42: 103-127.

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    Jensen and Murphy (1990). "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives." Journal of Political Economy Vol. 98.

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    Morck, et al. (1990). "Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?" The Journal of Finance Vol. 45: 31-48.

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    Raman, K., et al. (2001). "Executive Compensation and Corporate Acquisition Decisions." The Journal of Finance Vol. 56: 2299-2336.

    Ranft, A. L. and M. D. Lord (2000). "Acquiring new knowledge: The role of retaining human capital in acquisitions of high-tech firms." The Journal of High Technology Management Research Vol. 11: 295-319.

    Sanders, W. G. (2001). "Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay." Academy of Management Journal Vol. 44: 477-492.

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    二、中文文獻
    尤淑儀(2000),台灣企業購併效益分析,清華大學碩士論文。

    古庭綾(2010),高階經理人薪酬對併購公司分割行為的影響,成功大學碩士論文。

    江志山(2004),企業經營策略與薪酬策略對組織績效之影響,東吳大學碩士論文。

    林信泉(2004)吳政穎(1999),我國上市公司股權集中度、薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究,政治大學博士論文。

    吳政穎(1999),我國上市公司股權集中度、薪酬設計與公司經營績效關係之研究,政治大學博士論文

    洪玉舜、王泰昌(2005),績效衡量指標在高階主管現金薪酬契約中之相對重要性,證券市場發展季刊,第十七卷,第2期,35-100。

    涂淑惠(2002),管理才能、薪酬與組織績效關聯性之探討:人力資本理論之應用,中正大學碩士論文。

    孫梅瑞(1999),國內上市公司從事公司購併活動對經營績效影響之研究,政治大學博士論文。

    張詠巽(2010),併購、公司治理與高階經理人薪酬關係之研究,台北大學碩士論文。

    陳智偉(2008),併購公司之高階經理人薪酬與其公司績效之關聯性,南華大學碩士論文。

    鄒佳伶(2011),權益薪酬制度與公司現金持有,成功大學碩士論文。

    羅容恆(2003),購併活動對主併公司經營績效之影響:以台灣上市公司為例,中山大學碩士論文。
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    財務管理研究所
    101357020
    102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101357020
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[財務管理學系] 學位論文

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