政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/68288
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  全文笔数/总笔数 : 113392/144379 (79%)
造访人次 : 51220056      在线人数 : 932
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜寻范围 查询小技巧：
  • 您可在西文检索词汇前后加上"双引号"，以获取较精准的检索结果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜寻，建议至进阶搜寻限定作者字段，可获得较完整数据
    •  进阶搜寻


    请使用永久网址来引用或连结此文件: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/68288


    题名: 小型社會互惠及合作機制-雙向信任賽局之初探
    作者: 葉怡庭
    贡献者: 戴中擎
    葉怡庭
    关键词: 信任賽局
    網路賽局
    信任
    互惠
    Trust Game
    Network Game
    Trust
    Reciprocity
    日期: 2013
    上传时间: 2014-08-06 11:51:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究欲探討信任對於對社會動態發展影響及信任機制建立受那些因子影響。採用雙向信任賽局並納入個人差異進行研究分析，總共招募十組受測者，研究發現信任不一定能夠被建立，且每個組別動態發展存在差異，差異的原因受到初始情況、期中互動歷程影響，且兩部分皆受個人因素影響，初始情況是影響後續是否能建立良好合作與互惠關係之重要原因，愈是勤勞、溫順柔和、好動及豪爽的受測者其第一期願意於信任賽局投資之金額愈多；期中互動歷程，研究發現上一期投資金額、投資比率，及投資回報率對受測者而言是最重要的解釋變數，互動歷程相關變數則因人而異。
    In this study, we attempted to find out how trust affected social dynamic development and which factors will influence on the process of building trust mechanism. We recruited 10 groups of subjects and used two-way trust game to analyze it when individual differences were considered. This study showed that trust can’t be built under certain conditions and groups are heterogeneous in their initial conditions and interaction dynamics. This two parts are also influenced by individual differences. Initial condition is the key factor whether if the trust can be built. The more diligent, docile, lively, and forthright subject will offer more in first period. While in interaction dynamics within period, we found that invest, reward and invest ratio are the most important decisive factors to subjects. But variables about interaction dynamics within period depend on individual differences.
    參考文獻: 許功餘、王登峰、楊國樞 (2001)。台灣與大陸華人基本性格向度的比較。本土心理學研究，16，185-225。

    Anderson, L. R., Mellor, J. M., & Milyo, J. (2005) An Experimental Study of the Effects of Inequality and Relative Deprivation on Trusting Behavior. Working paper:14.

    Arrow, K. (1974) General Economic Equilibrium: Purpose, Analytic Techniques, Collective Choice. American Economic Review, 64(3), 253-272

    Ben-Ner, A., & Halldorsson, F. (2010). Trusting and trustworthiness: What are they, how to measure them, and what affects them. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(1), 64-79.

    Berg, J., Dickhaut, K., & McCabe, K. (1995) Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History. Games and Economics Behavior, 10(1), 122-142.

    Besley, T., & Payne, A. (2003) Judicial accountability and economic policy outcomes: evidence from employment discrimination charges. IFS Working Papers.

    Bohnet, I., & Zeckhauser, R. (2004) Trust, risk and betrayal. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55(4), 467-484.

    Buchan, N., & Croson, R. (1999) Gender and Culture: International Experimental Evidence from Trust Games. American Economic Review, 89(2), 386-391.

    Chaudhuri, A., & Gangadharn, L (2002) Gender Differences in Trust and Reciprocity. Working paper: 875.

    Chaudhuri, A., & Gangadharn, L. (2003) An Experimental Analysis of Trust and Trustworthiness. Southern Economic Journal, 73(4), 959-985.

    Charness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002) Understanding Social Preferences With Simple Tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117(3), 817-869.

    Cornelissen, G., Dewitte, S., Warlop, L., Yzerbyt, V. (2007). Whatever people say I am, that’s what I am. Social labeling as a social marketing tool. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 24(4), 278-288.

    Cox, J. C. (2004) How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 46(2), 260-281.

    Cox, J. C., & Cary, D. A. (2005) On the Nature of Reciprocal Motives: Evidence from the Ultimatum Reciprocity Measure. Western Economic Association International, 43(3), 623-635.

    Devetag, G., & Warglien, M (2003) Games and phone numbers: Do short-term memory bounds affect strategic behavior?, Journal of Economic Psychology, 24(2), 189-202.

    Di Cagno, D., & Sciubba, E. (2010) Trust, trustworthiness and social networks: Playing a trust game when networks are formed in the lab, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, 75(2), 156-167.

    Erte, X., & Cristina, B. (2010) When equality trumps reciprocity. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(3), 456-470.

    Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2001) Discrimination In A Segmented Society: An Experimental Approach. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 351-377.

    Francois, P., & Zabojnik, J. (2005) Trust, Social Capital, and Economic Development. Journal of the European Economic Association, 3(1), 51-94.

    Glaeser, E., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J. A., Soutter, C. L. (2000). Measuring Trust. Quarterly Journal of Economics , 65, 811-846.

    Guth, W., Levati, M., & Ploner, M. (2008) The Impact of Payoff Interdependence on Trust and Trustworthiness. German Economic Review, 9(02), 87-95

    Helliwell, J. F., & Putnam, R. D. (1995) Economic Growth and Social Capital in Italy. Eastern Economic Journal, 21(3), 295-307.


    Holm, H., & Dnaielson, A. (2005) Tropic Trust Versus Nordic Trust: Experimental Evidence From Tanzania and Sweden, Economic Journal, 115(503), 505-532.

    Johnson, N., & Mislin, A. (2011) Trust games: A meta-analysis. Journal of Economic Psychology, 32(5), 865-889.

    Jones, G., & Schneider, W. (2006) Intelligence, Human Capital, and Economic Growth: A Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) Approach. Journal of Economic Growth, 11(1), 71-93.

    Knack, S., & Keefer, P. (1997). Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (4), 1251-1288.

    Lea, S. E. G., Tarpy, R. M., & Webley, P. M. (1987). The individual in the economy: A Textbook of Economic Psychology. Cambridge University Press.

    McCabe, K., Rigdon, M., & Smith, V. (2003) Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52(2), 267-275.

    Segal, N. L., & Hershberger, S. L. (1999) Cooperation and competition between twins: Findings from a Prisoner`s Dilemma game. Evolution and Human Behavior, 20(1), 29-51.

    Weede, E., & Kampf, S. (2002) The Impact of Intelligence and Institutional Improvements on Economic Growth. Kyklos, 55, 361-380.

    Zack, P., & Knack, S. (1998) Trust and Growth. The Economic Journal, 111(470), 295–321.

    Zax, J. S., & Rees, D. I. (2002) IQ, Academic Performance, Environment, and Earnings. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(4), 600-616.
    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    經濟學系
    101258027
    102
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101258027
    数据类型: thesis
    显示于类别:[經濟學系] 學位論文

    文件中的档案:

    档案 大小格式浏览次数
    802701.pdf4362KbAdobe PDF2522检视/开启


    在政大典藏中所有的数据项都受到原著作权保护.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏，無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用，惟仍請適度，合理使用本網站之內容，以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用，則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作，已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益，如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者，請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw)，維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回馈