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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/67732


    Title: 鐵路地下化預算規劃之交易成本政治學分析
    Other Titles: A Transaction Cost Political Analysis of Underground Railway Budget Planning
    Authors: 曾偉豪
    Tseng, Wei-Hao
    Contributors: 地政系
    Keywords: 交易成本;實施成本;自償率;鐵路地下化
    Transaction Cost;Enforcement Cost;Self-Liquidating Ratio;Underground Railway
    Date: 2007.09
    Issue Date: 2014-07-28 11:16:04 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 鐵路地下化建設就預算規劃角度分析，因涉預算制度差異與政治協商等問題，在預算執行中不僅惡化資金缺口並已危及鐵路事業財務體質。本文依據交易成本理論之基礎，分析臺北都會區鐵路地下化建設因涉及公務與事業預算所造成的實施成本擴大問題；並就資金缺口之弭平，提出補貼策略的修正建議。惟資金缺口背後隱含資訊不對稱而產生錯誤決策的政治層面問題，致使實施成本逐年擴增。此觀察引發本文從交易成本政治學觀點進行分析的研究旨趣，並就預算規劃衍生的代理關係，分從資訊不對稱、代理問題、交易成本、認知差距、權益配置與誘因設計等方向進行課題之論述與回應，以探索經濟層面所無法釐清的關鍵決策因素。由此，本文論證了預算制度的差異預留了政治行動者的利益競逐與衝突空間，從而惡化了預算執行與配置的失能無效，也顯現了預算治理制度的重建與策略再造建議的提出，將有效減低鐵路地下化交易成本與政策失靈之風險。
    Inspired by the perspectives from transaction cost economics and politics, this paper demystifies the hierarchical and authoritative relationships between supervising and operating agencies within the budgetary process. We unravel the blanket category of transaction costs and break it down into empirically verifiable elements, including incomplete and asymmetric information, agency problems, transaction costs, stakeholder redistribution, ideology and incentives, etc. Political hazards are identified as being crucial determinants of the choice of political governance in budget execution and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards are also pointed out. The agencies in our analysis incur costs due to their provision of comprehensive budget design and tax revenue allocation, and are thus faced with a trade-off between providing incentives and reducing ex post costly enforcement. Extending transaction cost politics into the budgetary domain suggests that transaction costs in the current political market do not lead the project`s political stakeholders to move toward more efficient outcomes and actually result in significant enforcement costs. Framing the issue as a budgetary administration and project delivery problem, this paper highlights the challenges in using separation of power panels when the goals of the panels are uncodifiable. This paper concludes by offering ideas for institutional engineering and the establishment of a special subsidy. Furthermore, this paper argues that reformulating self-liquidating analysis and carefully justifying the authority and obligation relationships between agencies should play an important role in reducing transaction costs, ensuring enforceability of agreements, and achieving more efficient budgeting outcomes.
    Relation: 政治科學論叢, 33, 43-82
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[地政學系] 期刊論文

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