政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/67335

政大典藏 > College of Commerce > Department of Accounting > Theses > Item 140.119/67335

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/67335

Title:	管理當局能力與管理當局自願性盈餘預測之關聯性 The Relationship between Managerial Ability and Management Earnings Forecast
Authors:	林姿均 Lin, Tzu Chun
Contributors:	金成隆林姿均 Lin, Tzu Chun
Keywords:	管理當局能力自願性盈餘預測盈餘預測精確度財務預測型態 Managerial Ability Management Earnings Forecast Earnings Forecast Accuracy Disclosure Format
Date:	2013
Issue Date:	2014-07-07 11:13:48 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	本研究旨在探討管理當局發佈自願性盈餘預測意願、預測精確度、預測型態與管理當局能力之關聯性，並進一步檢測能力較佳之管理當局所發佈之盈餘預測對投資人是否具增額資訊內涵。實證分析結果顯示管理當局能力與管理當局發佈盈餘預測之機率呈顯著正相關，亦即管理當局能力愈好，發佈盈餘預測之機率愈高；再者，本研究發現能力愈佳之管理當局，其盈餘預測之精確度亦會較高；而實證結果亦顯示當管理當局能力較好時，較願意以資訊量較多之完整式財務預測型態發佈財務預測。增額測試結果則顯示市場對於能力較佳之管理當局發佈之自願性盈餘預測反應程度較高。 The primary objective of this thesis is to explore whether the managerial ability is related to management earnings forecast, earnings forecast accuracy , and disclosure format. Additionally, this thesis investigates whether managerial ability increases the informativeness of management earnings forecast for (potential) investors. Empirical results show that managers with superior ability tend to announce management earnings forecast and when managers have better ability, they shall announce more precise management earnings forecast. About disclosure format, this thesis finds that managers with superior ability prefer to announce complete earnings forecasts than simple ones. Additionally, market reaction will be more to the informativeness of management earnings forecast which made by managers with better ability.
Reference:	方智強與吳安妮，1997，臺灣經理人員主動揭露盈餘預測之實證研究，會計評論，第30期: 253-269。江幸瑾，2011，管理當局預測與權益資金成本關係之研究，國立政治大學會計系未出版碩士論文。李建然與周俊德，2002，管理當局信譽與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵關係之研究，會計評論，第34期: 79-99。李建然，2000，影響台灣上市公司自願性盈餘預測頻率之研究，會計評論，第32期: 49-79。林維珩與陳昭蓉，2005，股票市場對強制性財務預測誤差預期之研究，管理學報，第22卷第5期: 585-606。吳安妮，1993，臺灣經理人員主動揭露盈餘預測資訊內涵之實證研究，會計評論，第27期: 76-107。吳安妮，1991，經理人員自願揭露盈餘預測資訊給外界之決定因素-實證研究，會計評論，第25期: 1-24。金成隆、紀信義與林裕凱，2005，強制性財務預測與法人說明會關聯性之研究，管理學報，第22卷第5期: 629-651。林淑莉，2004，管理當局盈餘預測態度與自願性盈餘預測資訊內涵的關係，當代會計，第5卷第2期: 175-206。曹壽民、金成隆與呂學典，2011，股權結構與多角化，臺大管理論叢，第22卷第1期: 165-198。黃劭彥、鍾宇軒與歐建民，2009，股權結構、背書保證、會計師核閱與自願性財務預測精準度之關聯性研究，當代會計，第10卷第1期: 29-62。黃劭彥、李超雄與鍾宇軒，2007，我國財務預測資訊的揭露：制度變革與實施成效，今日會計，第109期: 77-87。黃劭彥、李超雄與鍾宇軒，2007，財務預測制度之揭露因素與實施成果，會計師季刊，第233期: 21-32。黃劭彥與鍾宇軒，2007，我國自願性財務預測資訊揭露流程與實施成效之探討，證券暨期貨月刊，第25卷5期: 5-18。詹靜秋，1993，我國財務預測公開制度之簡介，證券管理，第11卷第8期: 43-46頁。劉啟群與陳建樺，1998，上市公司管理當局自願性盈餘預測揭露及揭露時點之影響因素-台灣地區之實證分析，中國財務學刊，第6卷第1期: 1 -44。劉啟群與陳建樺，1998，管理當局盈餘預測精確度與自願性盈餘預測揭露關係之研究，中山管理評論，第6卷第2期: 411-440。顏信輝與陳慧玲，2011，自願性與強制性財務預測資訊內涵之比較，淡江人文社會學期刊，第48期: 74-103。 Akerlof, G. 1970. The market for “Lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488-500. Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings forecasts. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (5): 343-376. Aier, J., J. Comprix, M. Gunlock, and D. Lee. 2005. The financial expertise of CFOs and accounting restatements. Accounting Horizons 19 (3): 123-135. Boehmer, E., J. Musumeci, and B. A. Poulsen. 1991. Event-study methodology under conditions of event induced variance. Journal of Financial Economics 30: 253-272. Bamber, L., and Y. Cheon. 1998. Discretionary management earnings forecast disclosures: Antecedents and outcomes associated with forecast venue and forecast specificity choices. Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2): 167-190. Baginski, S., and J. Hassell, and M. Kimbrough. 2002. The effect of legal environment on voluntary disclosure: Evidence from management earnings forecasts issued in the U.S. and Canadian markets. The Accounting Review 77 (1): 25-50. Barth, M. 2003. Discussion of “Compensation policy and discretionary disclosure.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 34 (1-3): 311-318. Bertrand, M., and A. Schoar. 2003. Managing with style: The effects of managers on firm policies. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (4): 1169-1208. Bamber, L., J. Jiang, and I. Wang. 2010. What’s my style? The influence of top managers on voluntary corporate financial disclosure. The Accounting Review 85 (4): 1131-1162. Baik, B., D. Farber, and S. Lee. 2011. CEO ability and management earnings forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 28 (5): 1645-1668. Charnes, A., W. W. Cooper, and E. Rhodes. 1978. Measuring the efficiency of decision making units. European journal of operational research 2 (4): 429-444. Chang, S. C., C. F. Wang. 2007. The effect of product diversification strategies on the relationship between international diversification and firm performance. Journal of World Business, 42 (1): 61-79. Diamond, D. 1985. Optimal release of information by firm. Journal of Finance 40 (4): 1071-1094. Dechow, P., and C. Schrand. 2004. Earnings Quality. Charlottesville, VA: The Research Foundation of CFA Institute. DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and R. Stulz.2010. Seasoned equity offerings, market timing, and the corporate lifecycle. Journal of Financial Economics 95 (3): 275-295. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, and S. McVay. 2012. Quantifying managerial ability :A new measure and validity test. Management Science 58 (7): 1229-1248. Demerjian, P., B. Lev, M. Lewis, and S. McVay. 2013. Managerial ability and earnings quality. The Accounting Review 88 (2): 463-498. Francis, J., D. Philbrick, and K. Schipper. 1994. Shareholder and corporate disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (2): 137-164. Francis, J., A. Huang, S. Rajgopal, and A. Zang. 2008. CEO reputation and earnings quality. Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 109-147. Gaber, M. 1985. Management incentives to report forecast of corporate earnings. Ph. D. dissertation, The city University of New York. Hambrick, D., and P. Mason. 1984. Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top Managers. Academy of Management Review 9 (2): 193-206. Hitt, M. A., R. E. Hoskisson, and H. Kim. 1997. International diversification: Effects on innovation and firm performance in product-diversified firm. Academy of Management Journal 40 (4): 767-798. Hayn, C. 1995. The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 20 (2): 125-53. Healy, P. M., and K. G. Palepu. 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31 (1-3): 405-440. Hutton, A., and P. Stocken. 2009. Prior forecasting accuracy and investor reaction to Management earnings forecasts. Working paper, Boston College. Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360. Jaggi, B. and P. Grier. 1980. A comparative analysis of forecast disclosing and non-disclosing firm. Financial Management 9 (2): 38-43. Kasznik, R., and B. Lev. 1995. To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The Accounting Review 70 (1): 113-34. Karamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43 (3): 453-86. Kawk, B., B. Ro, and I. Suk. 2012. The Composition of top management with general counsel and voluntary information disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 54: 19-41. Lang, M., and R. Lundholm. 1993. Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 246-271. LaFond, R. 2008. Discussion of: “CEO reputation and earnings quality.” Contemporary Accounting Research 25 (1): 149-156. Lee, S., S. Matsunaga, and C. Park. 2010. Management forecast accuracy and CEO turnover. Working paper, University of Oregon. Pownall, G. and G. Waymire. 1989. Voluntary disclosure credibility and securities prices: Evidence from management earnings forecast: 1969-1973. Journal of Accounting Research 27 (2): 227-243. Ruland, W., S. Tung, and N. George. 1990. Factor associated with the disclosure of managers’ forecasts. The Account Review 65 (3): 710-721. Skinner, D. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research 32 (1): 38-60. Stein, J. 1997. Internal capital markets and the competition for corporate resources. The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 111-113. Trueman, B. 1986. Why do managers voluntarily release earnings forecasts? Journal of Accounting and Economics 8 (1): 53-71. Trueman, B. 1997. Managerial Disclosures and Shareholder Litigation. Review of Accounting Studies 2: 181-199. Verrecchia, R. 1983. Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics 5: 179-194. Waymire, G. 1984. Earnings volatility and voluntary management forecast disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research 23 (1): 268-295. Williams, P. 1996. The Relation Between a Prior Earnings Forecast by Management and Analyst Response to a Current Management Forecast. The Accounting Review 71 (1): 103-113. Weintraub, E. 2002. Neoclassical Economics. In The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics. Retrieved from http://www.econlib.org/Library /Encl/ NeoclassicalEconomics.html. Yang, H. I. 2012. Capital market consequences of managers’ voluntary disclosure styles. Journal of Accounting and Economics 53: 167-184.
Description:	碩士國立政治大學會計研究所 101353013 102
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101353013
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Accounting] Theses

Files in This Item:

There are no files associated with this item.

社群 sharing

Loading...