English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 27 |  Items with full text/Total items : 113648/144635 (79%)
Visitors : 51573681      Online Users : 892
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/65958
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/65958


    Title: The Association Between Corporate Governance and Audit Quality: Evidence from Taiwan
    Authors: 戚務君
    Chang, Yu-Shan;Chi,Wuchun;Hwang,Long-Jainn;Shiue, Min-Jeng
    Contributors: 會計系
    Keywords: Corporate governance;audit quality;publicly held companies;privately held companies
    Date: 2011.12
    Issue Date: 2014-05-12 15:51:03 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: Purpose – Audit quality is traditionally defined as the joint probability that an existing problem is discovered and reported by the auditor. This study examines whether and how audit quality is associated with related-party transactions and CEO duality. The first part (i.e., the ability to discover) is related to professional judgment, and the second part (i.e., report truthfully) is related to independence.</p><p>Methodology/Approach – Regression methods was used on archival data.</p><p>Findings – Our results reveal that for publicly held companies in environments with stronger capital market discipline, which causes greater reputation concerns and litigation risks, a CEO who is also the board chair does not hinder auditor independence. For privately held companies, however, such a CEO hinders auditor independence due to a lack of capital market discipline. The findings on related-party financing, on the other hand, are reversed. That is, in terms of information for an auditor, since the conflicts of interests are more severe in publicly held companies than in privately held companies, the relevance of related-party financing to a decision whether to issue a going-concern opinion is greater in publicly held companies.</p><p>Social implications – The empirical results of publicly held companies are useful for countries with better corporate governance, while those of privately held companies are helpful for countries with relatively weak corporate governance.</p><p>Originality/Value of paper – Because auditors performing audit services face different litigation risks and reputation concerns, the differences in our results between the two types of clients can have implications about the suitability of these types of companies in emerging markets
    Relation: Research in Accounting in Emerging Economics, 11(4), 129-153
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[會計學系] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    129153.pdf379KbAdobe PDF21507View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告 Copyright Announcement
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    The digital content of this website is part of National Chengchi University Institutional Repository. It provides free access to academic research and public education for non-commercial use. Please utilize it in a proper and reasonable manner and respect the rights of copyright owners. For commercial use, please obtain authorization from the copyright owner in advance.

    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    NCCU Institutional Repository is made to protect the interests of copyright owners. If you believe that any material on the website infringes copyright, please contact our staff(nccur@nccu.edu.tw). We will remove the work from the repository and investigate your claim.
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback