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    題名: 董事會組成與我國IPO電子產業盈餘管理之關聯性──兼論家族企業因素之影響
    Board composition and Real Earnings Management of Initial Public Offerings,electronics industry in Taiwan.──with analysis of the effect of family business
    作者: 張雅涵
    貢獻者: 郭弘卿
    張雅涵
    關鍵詞: 實質盈餘管理
    董事會組成
    初次上市櫃
    Real Earnings Management
    Board composition
    Initial Public Offerings
    日期: 2012
    上傳時間: 2014-03-03 15:30:30 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究旨在探討家族企業及非家族企業兩種不同的公司治理型態，其董事會各組成區塊與企業進行實質盈餘管理之間的關聯性。實質盈餘管理係以異常營運活動現金流量、異常生產成本及異常裁決性費用為衡量指標，並以2004年至2011年間我國初次上市櫃(IPO)的電子產業為樣本範圍。
    實證結果發現，在家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈可顯著抑制企業進行實質盈餘管理。(2)外部董事席次比率愈高，對企業進行實質盈餘管理有反向助長之傾向。(3)獨立董事席次愈多，愈能顯著監督企業進行實質盈餘管理，唯在企業以裁決性支出方式操弄盈餘方面較無監督能力。在非家族企業中：(1)最終控制者控制席次過半及外部董事席次比率的增加，對抑制企業從事實質盈餘管理無顯著效果。(2)獨立董事席次的增加可顯著抑制企業操弄盈餘。(3)經理人董事席次比率愈高，愈顯著助長企業進行實質盈餘管理。
    This thesis aims to discuss the relationship between board composition and real earnings management (hereafter, REM) under family business and non-family business. This study uses abnormal cash flow from operations, abnormal production costs, and abnormal discretionary expenses as a measure of real earnings management. Data is collected from electronics industry in Taiwan which applied for Initial Public Offerings (IPO) from 2004 to 2011.
    The empirical results show that in family business: (1) If the ratio of board seat-control of ultimate controller is over 50 percents, or the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it is helpful to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by REM.(2) Once the ratio of board seats of outside directors is higher, it is prone to promote firms to do REM.(3) Once the board seats of independent directors are more, it is significant to reduce the degree of REM. However, they seem to have no abilities to restrain firms from manipulating earnings by varying discretionary expenses. In non-family business: (1) The board seat-control of ultimate controller over 50 has nothing to do with decreasing the degree of REM. Also,the increase of the ratio of board seats of outside directors is not significantly to suppress the degree of REM. (2)The increase of board seats of independent directors is effectively to reduce the extent of REM. (3) If the ratio of board seats of manager is higher, it will push firms to manipulate earnings by REM.
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
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    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0100353046
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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