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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/63642


    Title: 雙邊投資協定之理論模型
    A theoretical explanation of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs)
    Authors: 曾蕙玲
    Tseng, Huei Lin
    Contributors: 徐則謙
    曾蕙玲
    Tseng, Huei Lin
    Keywords: 外人直接投資
    雙邊投資協定
    策略性投資政策
    Foreign Direct Investment
    Bilateral Investment Treaties
    Strategic Investment Policy
    Date: 2012
    Issue Date: 2014-02-10 14:47:19 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 直覺上,跨國資本的自由流動對投資國與被投資國的經濟均有益處,亦可促使資源在國際間以更有效率的方式分配,增進雙方的福利。然而實際上被投資國卻對外來投資加以限制,並且須透過雙邊協商的方式移除此限制。因此,前述自由投資增進兩國福利的直覺似乎與既存的眾多雙邊投資協定相互矛盾。本文建立一基本的理論模型,考慮直接投資以及兩國的策略性投資政策,藉以說明 Nash Equilibrium 為兩國相互課稅,且無單邊降稅的動機。因此,只有透過雙邊簽署投資協定的方式共同降稅,方能消除課稅所產生的無謂損失。
    Intuitively, the free mobility of transnational capital not only benefits home countries and host countries, but also allocates resources globally in a more efficient way, which makes their welfare increase. However, host countries actually implement many restrictions on cross-border capital and try to remove these through bilateral negotiations. Therefore, the intuition that free investment between two countries will increase their economic welfare seems to be contradictory to many existing bilateral investment treaties (BITs). This article provides a theoretical model with foreign driect investment (FDI) and strategic investment policies, first, as to explain the Nash Equilibrium is that two countries will tax investors` FDI behavior. Second, it explains both countries do not have any motivation to reduce taxes unilaterally. Therefore, only when these two countries decide to remove all restrictions on foreign capital mutually by signing bilateral investment treaties do they eliminate the deadweight loss which restraints bring about.
    Reference: Busse, Matthias, Königer, Jens, and Nunnenkamp, Peter (2010), “FDI promotion through bilateral investment treaties: more than a bit?”, Review of World Economics, 146(1), 147–177.

    Büthe, Tim and Milner, Helen V. (2008), “The politics of foreign direct investment into developing countries: Increasing FDI through international trade agreements?”, American Journal of Political Science, 52(4), 741–762.

    Büthe, Tim and Milner, Helen V. (2009), “Bilateral investment treaties and foreign direct investment: A political analysis”, in Karl P. Sauvant and Lisa E. Sachs (eds.), The Effect of Treaties on Foreign Direct Investment: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Double Taxation Treaties, and Investment Flows, chapter 6, 172–225, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Egger, Peter H. and Merlo, Valeria (2007), “The impact of bilateral investment treaties on FDI dynamics”, The World Economy, 30(10), 1536–1549.

    Egger, Peter H. and Pfaffermayr, Michael (2004), “The impact of bilateral investment treaties on foreign direct investment”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 32(4), 788–804.

    Elkins, Zachary, Guzman, Andrew T., and Simmons, Beth A. (2006), “Competing for capital: The diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, 1960-2000”, International Organization, 60, 811–846.

    Kerner, Andrew (2009), “Why should I believe you? the costs and consequences of bilateral investment treaties”, International Studies Quarterly, 53(1), 73–102.

    Krugman, Paul (1980), “Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of trade”, The American Economic Review, 70(5), 950–959.

    Neumayer, Eric and Spess, Laura (2005), “Do bilateral investment treaties increase foreign direct investment to developing countries?”, World Development, 33(10), 1567–1585.

    Oh, Chang Hoon and Fratianni, Michele U. (2010), “Do additional bilateral investment treaties boost foreign direct investment?”, Working Papers 2010-04, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Bloomington, Indiana,
    U.S.

    Salacuse, Jeswald W. and Sullivan, Nicholas P. (2005), “Do BITs really work? an evaluation of bilateral investment treaties and their grand bargain”, Harvard International Law Journal, 46(1), 67–130.

    Sokchea, Kim (2007), “Bilateral investment treaties, political risk and foreign direct investment”, Asia Pacific Journal of Economics and Business, 11(1), 6–24.

    Tobin, Jennifer L. and Rose-Ackerman, Susan (2011), “When BITs have some bite: The political-economic environment for bilateral investment treaties”, The Review of International Organizations, 6(1), 1–32.

    Urban, Dieter M. (2006), “Multilateral investment agreement in a political equilibrium”, CESifo Working Paper Series 1830, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research, Munich, Germany.
    Description: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    國際經營與貿易研究所
    101351004
    101
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0101351004
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[國際經營與貿易學系 ] 學位論文

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