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    Title: 交易所監管的實證分析：來自中國的證據
    The Empirical Analysis of Stock Exchange Regulatory Enforcement: Evidence from China
    Authors: 鍾宇軒
    Chung, Yu Hsuan
    Contributors: 戚務君
    Chi, Wu Chun
    鍾宇軒
    Chung, Yu Hsuan
    Keywords: 交易所監管
    誠信檔案
    紀律處分
    Stock exchange regulatory enforcement
    credit record files
    disciplinary sanctions
    Date: 2013
    Issue Date: 2014-01-02 13:27:26 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 交易所在證券市場中的監管乃是對上市公司監督的第一道防線，其紀律處分措施更是警示市場參與者的重要資訊。本文以中國深圳交易所誠信檔案中對上市公司監管的處罰與處分公告進行分析，實證結果發現交易所的紀律處分事件公告後，市場並不會有顯著的反應。再者，企業的監督治理機制能夠補捉與偵查到企業發生交易所紀律處分的可能性。最後，研究進一步發現交易所的紀律處分將有助於改善企業的財務報導品質。
    The first line of defense in firm supervision is a stock exchange regulatory enforcement, and its disciplinary sanctions convey important information to stock market participants. This study thus examines the causes and consequences of the disciplinary sanctions on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. This study also uses disciplinary penalties found in credit record files to analyze the effect of stock exchange regulatory enforcement. The results indicate that the firms with disciplinary sanctions have no reaction on stock price. Additionally, this study finds that governance and supervision mechanisms can explain a.) occurrence of disciplinary sanctions in a given firm, and b.) probability of detecting stock exchange regulatory enforcement. Finally, further analysis suggests that disciplinary sanctions significantly improve firms’ financial reporting quality.
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    Description: 博士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    97353501
    102
    Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0973535011
    Data Type: thesis
    Appears in Collections:[Department of Accounting] Theses

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