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    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/60808


    Title: 以賽局觀點探討私有土地參與捷運場站開發制度之研究
    Authors: 簡龍鳳;賴宗裕
    Chien,Lung-Feng;Lai,Tsung-Yu
    Contributors: 政大地政系
    Keywords: 場站開發;制度賽局觀;Nash均衡
    Station development;Game-based view of institutions;Nash equilibrium
    Date: 2010-12
    Issue Date: 2013-09-13 12:38:31 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 審視現行法令賦予私有土地參與捷運場站開發制度，包括政府和所有權人合作開發、政府徵收開發、所有權人申請開發等多樣性之土地開發方式。面對具提高不動產價值之捷運場站開發，研究思維理應從政府主導之單向性，轉變成政府與所有權人間之互動性，雙方最佳的策略與報酬，已不必然獨立於他人的行動之外，其間之策略組合報酬主要涉及權益分配率及開發回饋金，土地開發制度存在策略賽局關係。本文旨在探討私有土地參與捷運場站開發制度，引入制度經濟分析的理論框架中，嘗試以制度的賽局觀、Nash均衡和機制設計原理爲立論基礎，建立政府與所有權人權益分配之財務淨收益模型架構及賽局策略組合報酬函數，並運用Nash均衡原理探討雙方均衡策略組合及設計機制下之開發方式。本文從假設案例發現，在開發回饋金等於政府淨收益時，所對應之權益分配率爲合作開發與申請開發之分界點，且徵收開發及原狀，均非Nash均衡解。
    The institution of the MRT station development provides a diversity of land development in Taiwan, including cooperation development, expropriation development and application development. Development of MRT station has been transformed from government-led development into interactions between government and landowners. In terms of a game-based view of institutions-the Nash equilibrium and mechanism design concepts-this study establishes a model for both governmental and landowner revenue and a payoff function for their strategy combination. The equity distribution rate is determined between cooperation development and application development, where the value of a feedback payment equals the function of governmental revenue. In addition, expropriation development and non-development are not solutions for the Nash equilibrium.
    Relation: 都市與計劃, 37(4), 455-479
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[地政學系] 期刊論文

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