| Reference: | 一、 中文部分
周行一、陳錦村與陳坤宏，1996，家族企業、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究，中國財務學刊，第4卷第1期（7月）：115-139。
金成隆、蘇淑慧與呂倩如，2009，家族公司與盈餘品質關係之研究：所有權、管理權與控制權，臺大管理論叢，第19卷第S2期（9月）：35-70。
林宛瑩與許崇源，2008，台灣集團企業之控股型態及公司治理衡量指標之研究與建議，交大管理學報，第28卷第1期（6月）：269-312。
林明謙，2001，股權結構、董事組成對大股東介入股市行為影響之研究，私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
林美鳳、金成隆與林良楓，2009，股權結構、會計保守性與信用評等關係之研究，臺大管理論叢，第20卷第1期（12月）：289-330。
林嬋娟與張哲嘉，2009，董監事異常變動、家族企業與企業舞弊之關聯性，會計評論，第48期（1月）：1-33。
倉科敏材，2007，家族企業，張同林、楊理亞譯，上海：上海財經大學出版社。
翁淑育，2000，台灣上市公司股權結構、核心代理問題與公司價值之研究，私立輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
馬黛與李永全，2006，台灣家族公司負債融資成本之研究，管理評論，第25卷第3期（7月）：69-91。
馬黛與李永全，2008，家族控制對負債融資決策的影響－－以台灣為例，臺大管理論叢，第18卷第2期（6月）：133-170。
葉銀華，1999，家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究－－台灣與香港證券市場之比較，管理評論，第18卷第2期（5月）：59-86。
廖秀梅、李建然與吳祥華，2006，董事會結構特性與公司績效關係之研究－－兼論台灣家族企業因素的影響，東吳經濟商學學報，第54期（9月）：117-160。
二、 英文部分
Ali, A., T. Y. Chen, and S. Radhakrishnan. 2007. Corporate disclosures by family firms. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44 (1-2): 238-286.
Anderson, R., and D. M. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58 (3): 1301-1328.
Astrachan, J. H. and M. C. Shanker. 2003. Family businesses’ contribution to the U.S. economy: A closer look. Family Business Review 16 (3): 211-219.
Bhushan, R. 1989. Firm characteristics and analyst following. Journal of Accounting and Economics 11 (2-3): 255-274.
Bushman, R., J. Piotroski, and A. Smith. 2003. Insider trading restriction and analysts’ incentives to follow firms. Working paper, University of North Carolina and University of Chicago.
Byard, D., Y. Li, and J. Weintrop. 2006. Corporate governance and the quality of financial analysts’ information. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 (5): 609-625.
Chen, S., X. Chen, and Q. Cheng. 2008. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research 46 (3): 499-536.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, and L. H. P. Lang. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations. Journal of Financial Economics 58 (1-2): 81-112.
Cubbin, J., and D. Leech. 1983. The effect of shareholding dispersion on the degree of control in British companies: Theory and measurement. The Economic Journal 93 (370): 351-369.
DeAngelo, H., and L. DeAngelo. 1985. Managerial ownership of voting rights: A study of public corporations with dual classes of common stock. Journal of Financial Economics 14 (1): 33-69.
DeChow, P. M., R. G. Sloan, and A. Sweeney. 1996. Cause and consequence of earnings manipulation: An analysis of firms subject to enforcement actions be the SEC. Contemporary Accounting Research 13 (1): 1-36.
Demsetz, H. 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. Journal of Law and Economics 26 (2): 375-390.
Demsetz, H., and K. Lehn. 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: Causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93 (6): 1155-1177.
Dugar, A., and S. Nathan. 1995. The effect of investment banking relationships on financial analysts` earnings forecasts and investment recommendations. Contemporary Accounting Research 12 (1): 131-160.
Eng, L. L., and Y. T. Mak. 2003. Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 22 (4): 325-345.
Fan, J. P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informativeness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (3): 401-425.
Fan, J. P. H., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. Asset specificity, accounting quality, and family succession. Working paper, The Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Forker, J. J. 1992. Corporate governance and disclosure quality. Accounting and Business Research 22 (86): 111-124.
Francis, J., and D. Philbrick. 1993. Analysts’ decisions as products of a multi-task environment. Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 216-230.
Gomez-Mejia, L., M. Nuñez-Nickel, and I. Gutierrez. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal 44 (1): 81-95.
Gul, F. A., and S. Leung. 2004. Board leadership, outside directors’ expertise and voluntary corporate disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 23 (5): 351-379.
Hansen, R., and A. Sarin. 1998. Are analysts overoptimistic around seasoned equity offerings? Working paper, Santa Clara University.
Herrmann, D. R., O. K. Hope, and W. B. Thomas. 2008. International diversification and forecast optimism: The effects of Reg FD. Accounting Horizons 22 (2): 179-197.
Holderness, C. G. and D. P. Sheehan. 1988. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations: An exploratory analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1-2): 317-346.
Holderness, C. G., R. Kroszner, and D. P. Sheehan. 1999. Were the good old days that good? Evolution of managerial stock ownership and corporate governance since the great depression. Journal of Finance 54 (2): 435-469.
Hope, O. 2003. Accounting policy disclosures and analysts’ forecasts. Contemporary Accounting Research 20 (2): 295-321.
Hossain, M., M. H. B. Perera, and A. R. Rahman. 1995. Voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of New Zealand companies. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 6 (1): 69-85.
Irani, A. J., and I. Karamanou. 2003. Regulation fair disclosure, analyst following and analyst forecast dispersion. Accounting Horizons 17 (1): 15-29.
James, H. 1999. Owner as a manager, extended horizons and the family firm. International Journal of Economics of Business 6 (1): 41-56.
Jensen, M. C. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review 76 (2): 323-329.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48 (3): 831-880.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (4): 305-360.
Jensen, M. C., and R. S. Ruback. 1983. The market for corporate control: The scientific evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1): 5-50.
Kross, W., B. Ro, and D. Schroeder. 1990. Earnings expectation: The analysts’ information advantage. The Accounting Review 65 (2): 461-476.
Kuan, T. H., C. S. Li, and S. H. Chu. 2011. Cash holdings and corporate governance in family-controlled firms. Journal of Business Research 64 (7): 757-764.
Laderman, L., C. Hawkins, and I. Recio. 1990. How much should you trust your analyst? Business Week (July 23): 54-56.
Lang, M. H., and R. J. Lundholm. 1996. Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behavior. The Accounting Review 71 (4): 467-492.
Lang, M. H., K. V. Lins, and D. P. Miller. 2004. Comcentrated control, analyst following, and valuation: Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3): 589-623.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54 (2): 471-517.
Leuz, C., D. Nanda, and P. D. Wysocki. 2003. Earnings management and investor protection: An international comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69 (3): 505-527.
Loebbecke, J. K., M. M. Eining, and J. J. Willingham. 1989. Auditors’ experience with material irregularities: Frequency, nature, and detectability. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 9 (3): 1-28.
Lustgarten, S., and V. Mande. 1998. The effect of insider trading on financial analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 17 (4-5): 311-327.
Martínez, J I., B. S. Stöhr, and B. F. Quiroga. 2007. Family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from public companies in Chile. Family Business Review 20 (2): 83-94.
McConaughy, D. L., M. C. Walker, G. V. Henderson Jr., and C. S. Mishra. 1998. Founding family controlled firms: Efficiency and value. Review of Financial Economics 7 (1): 1-19.
Mishra, C. S., and D. L. McConaughy. 1999. Founding family control and capital structure: The risk of loss of control and the aversion to debt. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice. 23 (4): 53-64.
Morck, R. K., A. Shleifer, and R. W. Vishny. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1-2): 293-315.
Morck, R. K., D. A. Stangeland, and B. Yeung. 2000. Inherited wealth, corporate control and economic growth: The Canadian disease? Concentrated Corporate Ownership, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Moyer, R. C., R. E. Chatfield, and P. M. Sisneros. 1989. Security analyst monitoring activity: Agency costs and information demands. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24 (4): 503-512.
Raffournier, B. 1995. The determinants of voluntary financial disclosure by Swiss listed companies. The Eurpoean Accounting Review 4 (2): 261-280.
Richardson, S., S. Teoh, and P. Wysocki. 2004. The walk-down to beatable analysts’ forecasts: The role of equity issuance and inside trading incentives. Contemporary Accounting Research 21 (4): 885-924.
Schulze, W. S., M. H. Lubatkin, R. N. Dino, and, A. K. Buchholtz. 2001. Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science 12 (2): 99-116.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94 (3): 461-488.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny. 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52 (2): 737-783.
Stein, J. 1988. Takeover threats and managerial myopia. Journal of Political Economy 96 (1): 61-80.
Villalonga, B., and R. Amit. 2006. How do family ownership, management, and control affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 80 (2): 385-417.
Wang, D. 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (3): 619-656.
Wiwattanakantang, Y. 1999. An empirical study on the determinants of the capital structure of Thai firms. Pacific Basin Finance Journal 7 (3-4): 371-403.
Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke. 2001. Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2 (1-2): 21-48. |
