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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 金融學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/59306


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    題名: 外資持股與公司營運效率：台灣案例
    Foreign ownership and corporate operational efficiency: the case of Taiwan market
    作者: 黃俊凱
    Huang, Jiun Kai
    貢獻者: 李桐豪
    Lee, Tung Hao
    黃俊凱
    Huang, Jiun Kai
    關鍵詞: 金融自由化
    外國投資者持股比率
    公司營運效率
    獨立董事
    公司治理
    代理問題
    資料包絡法
    外國專業投資機構
    financial liberalization
    foreign investment shareholding ratios
    corporate operational efficiency
    independent directors
    corporate governance
    agency problem
    DEA
    QFII
    日期: 2012
    上傳時間: 2013-09-02 16:04:06 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 外國投資機構對新興證券市場的影響一直是個重要議題。本文利用無母數的資料包絡法 (DEA)，估計個別公司的營運效率。並探討外資持股比率、公司營運效率與績效表現之相互關聯性。本論文分三個主要的議題。
    在第二章中，首先確認外資持股比率與公司營運效率有顯著性的關聯。高外資持股有較佳的營運效率。在外資與公司績效表現的連結上，營運效率扮演部份中介效果。當外資持股進入穩定成熟期時：長期外資持股存量有助公司營運效率提升；短期持股變動量則對營運造成督導效果。整體而言，台灣對外資全面開放證券市場後，產生部分外溢效果，改善上市公司的營運效率與績效表現。
    第三章則進一步從外資的投資組合決策，來分析異質性與產業別效應。並研究台灣證券市場更自由化後，外資持股比率與公司營運效率所扮演的角色。本研究提出新的路徑來解釋外資與公司績效表現的關係：外資持股高的公司，有較好的營運效率；而較佳的公司經營效率，進一步驅動高的績效表現。伴隨金融市場的自由化，外資不僅僅是純粹的買賣交易者，也扮演部分的督導與監管功能，進而提高公司營運效率與績效表現，同時也增加其投資報酬率，特別是在，外銷產業與電子股。此兩角色並不互斥。希望台灣案例能成為其他新興市場的典範。
    使用三個不同的公司績效表現:營運效率、市場價值與會計帳面價值，第四章試圖找出外資持股、自願性任命獨立董事與公司績效表現的關連性。利用Berger et al. (2005)的模型，本文研究台灣非金融產業之上市公司的分類、選擇與動態效果。發現(1)外資偏愛有穩定性獨立董事的公司。且公司有較高的外資持股與穩定的獨立董事，有較佳的績效表現。(2)當公司市值惡化時，任命暫時性的獨立董事，以彰顯該公司有“好的績效”或安撫不滿投資者(或股東)的情緒。(3)在公司營運效率指標上，外資與穩定性獨立董事的關係:短期有替代效果；而長期則有互補效果。結合外部監管機制與內部稽核系統，本文提出在新興市場中，需要穩定的獨立董事與高比率的外資持股，來提升上市公司的績效表現。
    The influence of foreign investment institutions in emerging securities markets has long been an important issue. This thesis uses a nonparametric output-orientated Malmquist data envelopment analysis (DEA) method to estimate the relative operational efficiency of individual corporations, and endeavors to elucidate the correlation between the foreign ownership, corporate operational efficiency and corporate performance. This thesis consists of three essays.
    The first essay is presented in Chapter 2 and identifies a significant correlation between corporate operational efficiency and foreign investment shareholding ratios. Empirical results show that there is a nontrivial impact of foreign investors on corporate operational efficiency. The higher foreign ownership is the better corporate operational efficiency is. Interestingly, corporate operational efficiency plays a mediating role between foreign investors and corporate performance. When foreign investors achieve a stable and mature stage, the long-term foreign investment shareholding stock facilitates the enhancement of corporate operational efficiency, whereas short-term shareholding variation levels create pressure or monitoring and disciplinary effects for corporate operations. Overall, in Taiwan market, foreign investors could have spillover effects on listed companies and raise their efficiency and performance.
    The second essay, in Chapter 3, is elaborated on heterogeneity and industries effects. This study investigates the investment allocation choices of foreign investors and how the foreign ownership and corporate operational efficiency play roles in Taiwan market with more financial liberalization. Empirical results suggest a possible channel. Through this channel, a high level of foreign ownership significantly positively affects corporate operational efficiency, and then higher operational efficiency triggers better corporate performance. Specifically, with more liberalization, some foreign investors are not only speculators, but also they play the role of monitoring or disciplinary. They improve corporate operational efficiency and performance, and thus in turn their investment profits, especially high-tech and exporting companies. These two roles are not mutually exclusive. The case of Taiwan market may have established a paradigm for developing countries to follow.
    The third essay is based on Chapter 4. Using three different corporate performance measures as proxy for operation, achieved market and profit value, this research traces the effects of foreign ownership, voluntary appointment of independent directors and corporate performance. Following the methodology proposed by Berger et al. (2005), this study extends to nonfinancial industries and conducts a joint analysis of category, selection and dynamic effects of the listed companies in Taiwan. Empirical results show that foreign ownership is likely companies with voluntary appointment of stable independent directors. Listed companies with stable independent directors and high level of foreign ownership perform better than the others. In contrast, during the deterioration of corporate value, listed companies with appointment of interim independent directors could be used to signal “their ability” or aimed at appeasing unhappy investors. Interestingly, the findings also point to a substitution effect between foreign ownership and stable independent directors in the short-term, but a complementary effect between them in the long-run, especially corporate operational efficiency. Consequently, listed companies in emerging markets may need for stable independent directors and a high level of foreign investment shareholdings to improve their corporate performance.
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    描述: 博士
    國立政治大學
    金融研究所
    97352501
    101
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0097352501
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[金融學系] 學位論文

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