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    題名: 舞弊與董事會治理功能發揮之關聯性研究
    Reasearch on the Relationship between Fraud and Board Governance
    作者: 紀明瑩
    Chi, Ming Ying
    貢獻者: 許崇源
    紀明瑩
    Chi, Ming Ying
    關鍵詞: 公司治理
    舞弊
    董事會
    Logit模型
    日期: 2012
    上傳時間: 2013-09-02 15:29:32 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 本研究從董事會結構、董事會運作機制及公司股權結構之角度；並輔以舞弊發生要件，探討董事會治理功能對企業發生舞弊之影響，以研究董事會治理功能是否能有效遏止舞弊發生。本研究以1996年至2010年台灣曾發生舞弊之上市櫃公司為研究對象，將舞弊樣本公司與正常公司以1:3配對；以Logit模型做實證模型研究，以探討董事會治理功能是否能有效發揮監督功能，防治舞弊的發生。本研究發現，在控制其他變數後；在董事會結構組成方面，在控制資產規模效果下，過大的董事會規模會增加舞弊發生的機率；獨立董事的組成可以有效降低企業舞弊發生的機率。在董事會運作機制方面，董事長兼任總經理的公司較易發生舞弊；董事會運作越活絡的公司，董事會運作較有效，故更能降低舞弊發生的機率。在股權結構方面，董監事質押股數與舞弊發生機率成正比；公司股份盈餘偏離比與舞弊發生機率成正比；法人持股越高的公司較不易發生企業舞弊。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    100353034
    101
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G1003530341
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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