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Title:	懲罰怠惰、流失人才?升等續聘標準的經濟分析
Other Titles:	Punishing Shirkers and Brain Drain: An Economic Analysis of a Stricter Standard for Academic Promotion and Review
Authors:	林忠正 Chung-Cheng Lin
Contributors:	政大財政系
Keywords:	升等續聘;偷懶;反淘汰 academic promotion;shirking;adverse selection
Date:	2009-09
Issue Date:	2013-08-26 11:39:10 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	要提升學術研究單位的研究績效，一方面要能吸引與留住傑出人才投入研究行列，另一方面要能使聘任到的研究人才願意努力以赴而不偷懶怠惰。本文藉由設立與分析一個簡單的偷懶－反淘汰模型，指出近年來利用不斷提高升等續聘標準的懲罰性誘因，做為解決學者偷懶怠惰問題的主流思想。雖然在短期中享有克服偷懶問題的好處，卻會付出長期不能吸引或留住傑出人才投入研究行列的代價，結果在長期將使學術研究績效不升反降而得不償失。並且當一個學術研究單位為追求私自績效，採用提高升等續聘標準的懲罰性手段。會因降低進入學術市場的預期報酬，使得優秀人才望而卻步另擇它途發展，造成其他學術機構所能雇用到的人員素質也因而下降的負面外部性。換句話說，若無適當的配套措施，想要單純的以提高升等續聘標準的懲罰性誘因來刺激研究績效，可能反而使學術社群陷入「短多長空」與「損人利己」的雙重困境。 Popular wisdom has it that a stricter standard for academic promotion and/or review will improve the research productivity of scholars. My belief is that the popular wisdom is right in the short-run, but it may be wrong in the long-run. A stricter standard can deter the shirking problem among scholars and improve their research performance (the short-run effect), but it may discourage able youth from entering this professional and result in lower research productivity in the future (the long-run effect). A shirking-adverse selection efficiency wage model is set up to show this belief.
Relation:	經濟論文叢刊, 37(3), 301-323
Data Type:	article
DOI link:	http://dx.doi.org/10.6277/ter.2009.373.3
DOI:	10.6277/ter.2009.373.3
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Public Finance] Periodical Articles

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