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    题名: 勸退參選的賽局分析— 政黨利益模型
    其它题名: Game-Theoretic Analysis of Dissuading Candidates from Running for Elections
    作者: 王智賢
    Wang,Jue-Shyan
    贡献者: 政大財政系
    关键词: 黨內初選;勸退參選;序列均衡
    Primary;Dissuasion;Sequential Equilibrium
    日期: 2008-07
    上传时间: 2013-08-26 10:58:21 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 觀察台灣的政黨競選情形，特別是在黨內初選階段時，常會發生有黨內高層勸退新進參選人的現象。本文建立一賽局模型，利用序列均衡(sequential equilibrium)的概念，嘗試將此政黨高層的政治手腕，提供理論的研究基礎，並預測出黨內競選的職位愈高、當選利益愈大以及預期其他政黨參選實力較弱時，黨內高層愈不容易有勸退成功的情況。
    After observing the campaigns of the political parties in Taiwan, especially in the phase of a primary election in the party, I found that there is a common phenomenon in which the authorities of the party dissuaded the beginning candidates from running for the elections. This paper establishes a model of game theory by using the concept of sequential equilibrium. I attempt to take use of the authorities` political techniques to supply the researching basis for the theory. The model predicts that it is more difficult for the authorities to dissuade candidates from running for elections under the following conditions: the position in the party to be campaigned is higher, the interests of winning elections are higher, and the opponent of the other party is not tough.
    關聯: 經社法制論叢, 42, 193-227
    数据类型: article
    显示于类别:[財政學系] 期刊論文

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