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    政大機構典藏 > 商學院 > 會計學系 > 學位論文 >  Item 140.119/56301


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    題名: 中國上市公司強制實施XBRL財務報導格式對於經營績效之影響 –中國國有企業觀點
    The Mandatory Adoption of XBRL and The Firm Performance – Evidence from the State-owned Enterprises in China
    作者: 文經堯
    貢獻者: 諶家蘭
    文經堯
    關鍵詞: 可延伸商業報導語言
    中國國有企業
    經營績效
    財務報導
    資訊揭露
    資訊透明度
    eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)
    State-owned-enterprise (SOE)
    Firm Performance
    Financial Reporting
    Information Disclosure, Information Transparency
    日期: 2011
    上傳時間: 2012-12-03 11:21:39 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 為改善資訊揭露環境，並增進上市公司的資訊透明度，上海證券交易所在2004年起對所有上市公司強制實施XBRL財務報導格式，本研究檢驗強制實施XBRL財務報導格式對於公司經營績效之影響，以上海證券交易所上市公司為研究對象，研究期間為2003年至2010年，並考慮中國國有企業的特色，將樣本公司分為國有企業與民營企業，分別檢視強制實施XBRL財務報導格式對其經營績效之影響。基於中國國有企業之組織特性，本研究假設僅有民營企業可獲益於強制實施XBRL財務報導格式，並因此提升經營績效。實證結果顯示，確實僅有民營企業獲得XBRL財務報導的效益，在強制實施XBRL財務報導格式後經營績效提升，但由於組織特性的關係，強制實施XBRL財務報導格式的預期效益並未顯現在國有企業，對中國國有企業來說，資訊透明度與外部監督的提升不足以解決其經營上之代理問題。
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    描述: 碩士
    國立政治大學
    會計研究所
    99353029
    100
    資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099353029
    資料類型: thesis
    顯示於類別:[會計學系] 學位論文

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