政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/54959

政大機構典藏-National Chengchi University Institutional Repository(NCCUR):Item 140.119/54959

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政大典藏 > College of Social Science > Department of Public Finance > Theses > Item 140.119/54959

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/54959

Title:	廠商聯合行為與政府反托拉斯之策略互動 Interaction between joint ventures and the antitrust authority
Authors:	林葦杭 Lin, Wei Hang
Contributors:	王智賢 Wang, Jue Shyan 林葦杭 Lin, Wei Hang
Keywords:	反托拉斯卡特爾聯合行為租稅優惠創新研發 R&D 資訊不對稱 Antitrust Cartel joint venture tax incentives innovative development R&D information asymmetry
Date:	2011
Issue Date:	2012-10-30 14:27:16 (UTC+8)
Abstract:	為了維護全球經濟的穩定與公平，近年來各國無不致力於反壟斷政策的執行，以期有效打擊卡特爾式的企業聯合行為。本文從三種不同的環境條件下，逐一探討採取聯合行為的廠商和反托拉斯政府之間的互動情況。透過本研究可發現，廠商在以利潤為優先考量下，來決定是否採取聯合結盟，以及合法或非法的合作型態。此外，為了朝全社會效率極大的目標邁進，本文針對三種環境設定下的均衡結果進行效率性的比較，得知其差異的成因在於政府和廠商報酬差異的大小。 In order to keep the stability and fairness of global economy, most of the authorities around the world have been fighting for cutting down cartels by implementing Antitrust/Competition Law. In this paper, we analyze the interaction between joint ventures and antitrust authorities in three different cases. And we find that profit always takes priority in firms’ decision, no matter how the economic environment changes. Finally, in discussing social utility, we compare efficiency among the three cases, and reach our conclusion that the difference of government’s and firm’s return causes the efficiency or non-efficiency of those optimal strategies.
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Description:	碩士國立政治大學財政研究所 99255022 100
Source URI:	http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0992550222
Data Type:	thesis
Appears in Collections:	[Department of Public Finance] Theses

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