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| Title: | 中國大陸財政地方分權對地方財政赤字的影響
The effect of fiscal decentralization on China’s reigion finance deficit |
| Authors: | 顏文彬 |
| Contributors: | 黃智聰
Huang , Jr Tsung
顏文彬 |
| Keywords: | 財政地方分權
地方財政赤字
二因子固定效果模型
Fiscal decentralization
Local government deficit
Two Ways Fixed effect model |
| Date: | 2011 |
| Issue Date: | 2012-10-30 11:32:40 (UTC+8) |
| Abstract: | 中國大陸自改革開放之後，其經濟成長之快速，成功歸究於自由的市場經濟。然而2008金融海嘯爆發後，使得各國開始檢視過度的分權和市場自由化的適度性。中央政府和地方政府，如何在權利和稅收的分配上，達成一最適的規模？如何有效運用財政地方分權？將是一門複雜且重要的議題。
本研究之研究目的主要有以下幾點：第一，希望能藉由相關理論文獻，解釋財政地方分權對中國省、市之間地方財政赤字是否會有所影響或是關聯，將以此為本研究之理論基礎，並且進行實證的檢驗；第二，將以1994年以後中國財政改革以後之財政相關資料，利用中國31個省、市的追蹤資料，資料蒐集期間涵蓋1995年至2010年，以各年各省、市的財政赤字作為衡量該省、市的財政情形，以期能夠了解各地區財政的影響情形； 第三，本研究建立一個二因子固定效果模型，來檢視中國31個省市財政分權對其地方財政赤字的影響，並將各省市的情形做歸納；第四，從實證模型中發現，財政地方分權與地方財政赤字間的關聯性為一非線性關係且具有U型曲線關係；最後，利用實證結果來提供具體的政策建議。
Fiscal decentralization is considered as one of the successful institutional reforms to promote the development of China.In order to attract the resource, the regions have to improve or maintain their finance. Therefore, what issues will improve the provincial local government deficit becoming an immense problem. How to use fiscal decentralization tool？It will be an important issue.
The research purpose of this literature is to use the empirical model with the panel data which includes 31 provinces, cities and regions in China during the period of 1995 to 2010 as well as to search the following question. First , analyse the provincial local government deficit and find out the determinative factors of regional deficit. Second, in order to realize the precise relationship between the fiscal decentralization and the provincial local government deficit, this study establishes 2 ways fixed effect model. Finally, to reducing the mistakes occurred in positive models and enabling the study more rigorous, this study uses more methods to test the models and the result. Finally, to reducing the mistakes occurred in positive models and enabling the study more rigorous, this study uses more methods to test the models and the result. |
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| Description: | 碩士
國立政治大學
財政研究所
99255021
100 |
| Source URI: | http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0099255021 |
| Data Type: | thesis |
| Appears in Collections: | [財政學系] 學位論文
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